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PLANETARIAN IDENTITY FORMATION AND THE 
RELOCALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Sarah Krakoff* 
Abstract 
Local food, local work, local energy production—all are hallmarks 
of a resurgence of localism throughout contemporary environmental 
thought and action. The renaissance of localism might be seen as a 
retreat from the world’s global environmental problems. This Article 
maintains, however, that some forms of localism are actually 
expressions, appropriate ones, of a planetary environmental 
consciousness. This Article’s centerpiece is an in-depth evaluation of 
local climate action initiatives, including interviews with participants, as 
well as other data and observations about their ethics, attitudes, 
behaviors, and motivations. The values and identities being forged in 
these initiatives form the basis for timely conceptions of the human 
relationship with the planet, which in turn provide grist for 
environmental law and policy design. One overarching conclusion is 
that environmental laws, even those aimed at solving problems of 
planetary scale, should include elements that foster localism. The 
reasons to do so are twofold and strangely complementary. First, in an 
instrumentalist vein, sustained attitude and behavior changes are most 
likely to be accomplished through the positive feedbacks between 
personal and community norms. Second, if we fail to rein in carbon 
emissions as a global matter, at least some communities will have 
nurtured the attitudes, behaviors, and patterns of living that might be 
most adaptive to the resource challenges and scarcities of a climate-
changed world. By fostering the planetarian identity, localism therefore 
has the potential to redeem environmental law, even in the face of its 
potential failure. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor and Wolf-Nichol Fellow, University of Colorado Law School. I am grateful 
to the participants in “New Thinking About Climate Change Law and Policy Works-in-Progress 
Symposium,” Summer 2009, for their thoughtful feedback on an early draft, and to my 
colleagues at Colorado Law for their helpful comments at a Works-in-Progress workshop during 
Spring 2010. I owe particular thanks to William Boyd, John Carlson, Jed Purdy, and Pierre 
Schlag for having the patience to read and provide excellent guidance on multiple versions, as 
well as to Dan Kahan and Doug Kysar for commenting on an earlier unpublished paper, much 
of which was cannibalized for this Article. Elise Aiken, Beth Baldwin, Cinque McKinney, 
Gabriella Stockmayer, and Kathryn Urbanowicz provided indispensable research assistance.  
Thanks also to the University of Colorado Law School for summer research funding, and to the 
Human Research Committee at the University of Colorado for assistance obtaining the 
necessary approvals to do this work. Finally, Ann Carlson and her terrific students in the Energy 
Law seminar at UCLA provided incisive comments on the near-final version of this Article. 
1
Krakoff: Planetarian Identity Formation And The Relocalization Of Environm
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
88 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 89 
 
 I. THE RESURGENCE OF LOCALISM IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD ...... 93 
  A. Manifestations and Roots of Localism .............................. 93 
  B. The Tragedy of the Atmospheric Commons ....................... 97 
  C. Political and Psychological Tragedy .............................. 101 
  D. Tragedy at the Highest Scales of Governance (The  
   Role of the State, Part One) ............................................. 104 
  E. The Localization of Climate Law .................................... 106 
 
 II. LOCAL CLIMATE ACTION GROUPS: WHAT, HOW, AND WHY ..... 107 
  A. Local Climate Action Initiatives Up Close ...................... 109 
   1. A Sunday Afternoon in Boulder, Colorado .............. 109 
   2. Building Community: Tearing Down the Old  
    Energy Economy? ..................................................... 113 
   3. A Brief Word on Methodology ................................ 114 
   4. Carbon Rationing Action Groups ............................. 115 
    a. Background ....................................................... 115 
    b. Responses .......................................................... 118 
     i. Motivations and Catalysts .......................... 118 
     ii. Individual Behavior Changes and Their  
      Efficacy ...................................................... 118 
     iii. Importance of the Group in Spurring  
      Personal Reductions ................................... 120 
     iv. Assessment of Emissions Reductions:  
      Quantity and Quality .................................. 120 
     v. Views About Geoengineering Solutions ..... 122 
     vi. Degree of Optimism: How Optimism or  
      Pessimism Informs Assessment of the  
      Worth of Individual and Small Group  
      Action ......................................................... 123 
   5. Neighborhood Climate Action and  
    Sustainability Groups ............................................... 124 
    a. Background ....................................................... 124 
    b. Responses .......................................................... 124 
     i. Motivations and Catalysts .......................... 124 
     ii. Individual Behavior Changes and Their  
      Efficacy ...................................................... 125 
     iii. Importance of the Group in Spurring  
      Personal Reductions ................................... 127 
     iv. Assessment of Emissions Reductions:  
      Quantity and Quality .................................. 128 
     v. Views About Geoengineering Solutions ..... 128 
 
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss1/3
2012] PLANETARIAN IDENTITY FORMATION 89 
 
     vi. Degree of Optimism: How Optimism or  
      Pessimism Informs Assessment of the  
      Worth of Individual and Small Group  
      Action ......................................................... 129 
  B. Insights from Local Climate Action: Behavior,  
   Happiness, Ethics, and Values ........................................ 130 
 
 III. TENDING THE PLANETARIAN IDENTITY .................................... 133 
  A. The Role of the State, Part Two ....................................... 133 
  B. A Blueprint for a Climate-Changed Democracy ............. 135 
 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 138 
INTRODUCTION 
Local food, local work, local energy production—all are hallmarks 
of a resurgence of localism throughout contemporary environmental 
thought and action.1 The renaissance of localism might be seen as a 
retreat from the world’s big, scary, and intractable problems. This 
Article argues, however, that some forms of localism are actually 
expressions, appropriate ones, of a planetary environmental 
consciousness. These forms of localism are not withdrawals from the 
world but are instead self-conscious attempts to link ethics and 
behaviors with environmental problems of planetary scale. This 
Article’s centerpiece is a qualitative evaluation of local climate action 
initiatives, including interviews with participants, as well as other data 
and observations about their ethics, attitudes, behaviors, and 
motivations. The values and identities being forged in these initiatives 
form the basis for timely conceptions of the human relationship with the 
planet, which in turn provide grist for environmental law and policy 
design. The upshot is this: environmental laws, even those aimed at 
solving problems of planetary scale, should include elements that foster 
localism. The reasons why are twofold, and strangely complementary. 
First, in an instrumentalist vein, sustained attitude and behavior changes 
are most likely to be accomplished through the positive feedbacks 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Documenting this trend, many popular books support a return to localism. See, e.g., 
BARBARA KINGSOLVER, ANIMAL, VEGETABLE, MIRACLE: A YEAR OF FOOD LIFE (2007) 
(documenting a family’s effort to live for one year only on food that they produced or could 
barter for locally); BILL MCKIBBEN, EAARTH: MAKING A LIFE ON A TOUGH NEW PLANET (2010) 
(supporting localism in response to climate change); MICHAEL POLLAN, IN DEFENSE OF FOOD: 
AN EATER’S MANIFESTO (2008) (supporting local and sustainable food production and farming 
practices); MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR MEALS 
(2006) (examining the origins of a typical meal, and arguing in support of local food 
production). 
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between personal and community norms.2 Climate action groups, for 
these and other reasons, hold promise to be important parts of what 
Professor Elinor Ostrom has described as the necessary “polycentric” 
approach to addressing climate change.3 Second, if we fail to rein in 
carbon emissions as a global matter (a more-than-likely scenario), at 
least some communities will have nurtured the attitudes, behaviors, and 
patterns of living that might be most adaptive to the resource challenges 
and scarcities of a climate-changed world.  
Part I situates local climate action initiatives in the larger trend 
toward relocalization. Part I also explores the potential paradox that 
these local climate action groups are tackling a collective action 
problem of global and intergenerational scale. Localism, in this context 
more than others, warrants study to illuminate how and why norms and 
behaviors of planetary concern emerge despite their apparently long 
odds of success.  
Part II investigates neighborhood climate action groups—informal, 
community-based efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions—up 
close. Participants in such groups were surveyed and interviewed 
concerning their motivations to join and participate, their changes in 
behavior, their success at reducing emissions, their assessment of the 
group’s role in encouraging those reductions, and their optimism about 
the future with respect to stabilizing global climate change. The 
responses indicate, first, that many participants have engaged in a wide 
range of behavior changes to reduce their carbon footprints. Second, the 
responses reveal that participants in these movements have, in general, a 
very nuanced and complicated view of their own motivations. They 
want to contribute to a global solution that will stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations and preserve the Earth as they know it. At the same time, 
some respondents express skepticism that such a result will be 
forthcoming, and therefore also articulate a mix of reasons why they are 
still taking action. These reasons include: the importance of building 
community; doing the “right thing” irrespective of outcomes; leaving a 
legacy of trying to avert tragedy for future generations, even if tragedy 
ensues; and establishing habits and patterns that will equip present and 
future generations to live in a very different world. As one participant 
stated: “Even if our civilization fails, at least we’ve tried to create a 
blueprint for future cultures. We owe this to the generations that follow 
us and all the human beings that have sacrificed to give us what we 
have today.”4  
                                                                                                                     
 2. See infra notes 7–8, 241. 
 3. See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change (The 
World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at 
http://go.worldbank.org/09BW8HU3A0.  
 4. Response of Henry Mueller, Neighborhood Climate Action Group Questionnaire 
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Professor Robert Socolow, coauthor of the widely cited “wedges” 
approach to stabilizing climate change,5 has mused that we might need 
the emergence of a “planetary identity” as much as, or more than, we 
need regulatory and technological solutions to address climate change.6 
Local climate action participants might be characterized as the leaders 
in planetarian identity formation, in that they perceive their moral 
obligations to extend to far-flung communities (both human and biotic) 
across space and time. In addition, their actions yield information about 
steps that individuals, albeit the most committed and engaged ones, will 
take to reduce their carbon footprint, and how those steps have affected 
their lives. This information, coupled with respondents’ articulation of 
their motivations, helps fill in our understanding of the efficacy of top-
down, state-led efforts to encourage similar behavior changes.7  
Part III considers the role of the state in light of what has been 
learned about local climate action initiatives. To date, the literature on 
individual behavior and climate change has largely addressed how the 
state can prod us to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions.8 Relying on 
insights from behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, and the 
literature on institutional design, commentators have proposed various 
mechanisms for regulating, incentivizing, and otherwise nudging people 
to be more carbon-neutral.9 This Article approaches the issue from the 
bottom up, asking not what the state can do to prod people, but rather 
what people are already doing to live a life that might be meaningful 
and even fun, while at the same time creating habits and paths for 
subsequent generations to follow. In other words, rather than formulate 
                                                                                                                     
(June 15, 2009) (on file with author).  
 5. See S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for 
the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 passim (2004). 
 6. See Robert H. Socolow & Mary R. English, Living Ethically in a Greenhouse, in 
ENERGY AND ETHICS 170, 170–71 (Denis Arnold ed., 2011). 
 7. Several scholars have examined how the government might influence individual 
behavior changes and their contributions to climate change. See John C. Dernbach, Harnessing 
Individual Behavior to Address Climate Change: Options for Congress, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 107 
(2008); Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and 
Social Norms, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 407 (2006); Albert C. Lin, Evangelizing Climate 
Change, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1135 (2009); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, 
The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., 
Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2008).  
 8. See, e.g., Jed S. Ela, Law and Norms in Collective Action: Maximizing Social 
Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 117–24 (2009) 
(arguing that the state should target high visibility behaviors based on insights from social 
norms literature); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7. Similarly, commentators have 
focused on legal and institutional designs that could counterbalance our tendencies to discount 
the value of future benefits and minimize the risks of future harms. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, 
Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157 (2009). 
 9. See, e.g., Dernbach, supra note 7; Vandenbergh & Steineman, supra note 7. 
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proposals to get the state to act on us, this Article addresses how, and 
why, we choose to act to address vexing environmental problems, even 
without state action. However, focusing on communities and individuals 
does not let the state off the hook.10 Rather, the idea is to rethink the 
state role; government efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
should be organized to support, rather than stifle, local practices that 
foster the planetarian identity.11 That way, even if state efforts fail to 
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions (the chances of which, as discussed 
in Part I, are sadly undeniable), we will have the opportunity to fashion 
societies capable of weathering the changed climate. Part III therefore 
concludes by considering, in preliminary fashion, how a federal climate 
regime might embrace local climate action initiatives. By engaging with 
communities rather than acting on individuals, the state might generate 
new possibilities for governance in a world increasingly bereft of 
examples of relevant and successful state action.12 Furthermore, given 
the failure to pass any comprehensive climate legislation to date, and 
the unlikely prospects for doing so in the near future, encouraging and 
cultivating local action may be all the state can manage to do.  
The Article concludes, despite some of its optimism, with realism 
about what local climate action might ultimately yield. If we assume 
that the local initiatives never translate up into higher-scale solutions, 
and that the state fails to be part of a polycentric solution (or any kind of 
solution), then local climate action groups may be important solely 
because of the habits of living they cultivate. Norms and behaviors 
reflecting less dependence on energy; more local knowledge about food, 
landscape, and weather; and greater reliance on friends and neighbors 
may be beneficial ends in themselves. In this scenario, the efforts of 
local climate action groups will not be enough to save the planet, or at 
least a planet with ecologies, cultures, and species that have evolved for 
the climate as we know it. But they might be enough to sow the seeds 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Indeed, as Professor Katherine Trisolini writes, “To achieve critical climate change 
goals, we will likely need all levels of government acting in concert . . . .” Katherine A. 
Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate 
Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 677 (2010) (emphasis added); see also Garrick B. 
Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877 (2011) (analyzing the relative 
institutional capacities of different levels of government for combating climate change).  
 11. Trisolini, supra note 10, at 677. 
 12. See TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND 134–35, 163–66 (2010) (describing failure of 
politics to address climate change and other urgent global problems, and consequent loss of faith 
in political institutions). The “New Governance” movement in legal scholarship also aspires to 
describe relevant models for successful state action in a post-statist world. See Daniel J. Fiorino, 
Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 441 (1999); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 423–32 (2004) (describing 
new governance approaches to environmental law).  
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for life on a different planet that would nonetheless be worth living on. 
I.  THE RESURGENCE OF LOCALISM IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 
Localism—placing value on working and buying locally—has been 
touted as among the top twenty trends that will shape the next decade.13 
Whether that prediction proves true or not, the resurgence of interest in 
creating vital, self-sustaining communities is undeniable. To provide 
some context for the local climate action groups examined in Part III, 
this Part describes localization trends generally and briefly traces 
localism’s roots in environmental thought. Despite localism’s appeal, 
there are reasons to be skeptical that local communities, acting on their 
own, can do anything about environmental problems of planetary scale. 
To give this skepticism its due, this Part also describes the daunting 
collective action problem that climate change presents. 
A.  Manifestations and Roots of Localism 
It might at first seem curious that localism would be a response to 
environmental challenges that are increasingly global in cause and 
effect. Yet the impulse, put in bumper-sticker terms, to “think globally, 
act locally,” is widespread. The “Transition” movement is perhaps the 
most all-encompassing version of localism.14 The Transition movement 
supports efforts to create small community groups with the dual purpose 
of encouraging low-carbon lifestyles and preparing for a post-carbon 
world by “rebuilding a community’s capacities to meet its own essential 
needs in food, energy and economy.”15 As one scholar described, these 
groups work “at [the] grassroots level, to develop local solutions to peak 
oil and climate change based on developing much more resource-poor[,] 
yet enjoyable and fulfilling[,] livelihoods based in more localised 
economies.”16 The Transition movement has taken hold in 103 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See, e.g., INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT 14 (Oct. 2010), http://http-download.intuit.com/ 
http.intuit/CMO/intuit/futureofsmallbusiness/intuit_2020_report.pdf (placing localism among 
the top twenty trends that will change the next decade). 
 14. See generally TRANSITION U.S., http://www.transitionus.org/initiatives/cheerful-
disclaimer (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
 15. TRANSITION COLORADO, http://www.transitioncolorado.us/transitioncolorado.php (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2011). Transition U.S.’s “cheerful disclaimer” reads as follows:  
We truly don’t know if this will work. Transition is a social experiment on a 
massive scale. What we are convinced of is this: If we wait for the 
governments, it’ll be too little, too late. If we act as individuals, it’ll be too 
little. But if we act as communities, it might just be enough, just in time.  
TRANSITION U.S., http://www.transitionus.org/initiatives/cheerful-disclaimer (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011). 
 16. Peter North, Eco-Localisation as a Progressive Response to Peak Oil and Climate 
Change—A Sympathetic Critique, 41 GEOFORUM 585, 586 (2010). 
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communities in the United States.17 
The local food movement, which embraces a return to local food 
production and consumption, is a related manifestation of the 
localization trend.18 One of the local food movement’s initial goals was 
to reduce the number of miles that food traveled before people ate it.19 
Reducing “food miles” would, according to proponents, improve the 
quality of food consumed and reduce its carbon footprint.20 In 2010, the 
USDA Farmers Market Directory listed 6,132 operational farmers 
markets in the United States, representing a 16% growth from 2009.21 
The local food movement spawned a term, “localvore” (or “locavore”), 
for one who eats only food sourced within a 100-mile radius of one’s 
home.22 The most visible locavore lives in the White House. First Lady 
Michelle Obama made headlines for planting, and then expanding, the 
first White House vegetable garden since Eleanor Roosevelt’s.23  
The economic theory of ecolocalism posits that environmental 
sustainability requires the creation of “local currency systems, food 
coops, micro-enterprise, farmers’ markets, permaculture, community 
supported agriculture (CSA) farms, car sharing schemes, barter systems, 
cohousing and eco-villages, mutual aid, home-based production, 
community corporations and banks, and localist business alliances.”24 
The overarching idea is that local economies can simultaneously reduce 
overall consumption and create the proper norms and incentive 
structures to perpetuate meaningful, yet environmentally sustainable, 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See TRANSITION U.S., http://www.transitionus.org/initiatives-map (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011). 
 18. Amory Starr, Local Food: A Social Movement?, 10 CULTURAL STUD. <=> CRITICAL 
METHODOLOGIES 479 (2010). 
 19. Derrick Braaten & Marne Coit, Legal Issues in Local Food Systems, 15 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 9, 11 (2010). 
 20. Id.  
 21. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Announces that National Farmers Market 
Directory Totals 6,132 Farmers Markets (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ 
ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateU&navID=&page=Newsroom&resultType=Deta
ils&dDocName=STELPRDC5085966&dID=136226&wf=false&description=USDA+Announce
s+that+National+Farmers+Market+Directory+Totals+6%2C132++Farmers+Markets&topNav=
Newsroom&leftNav=&rightNav1=&rightNav2=. 
 22. Katy McLaughlin, The Rise of the Lazy Locavore, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2010, at D4. 
 23. See Marian Burros, Obamas to Plant Vegetable Garden at White House, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 2009, at A1; Natasha Metzler, Michelle Obama Expands the White House Garden, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 1, 2010, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/The-
Culture/Gardening/2010/0401/Michelle-Obama-expands-the-White-House-garden. Some have 
criticized the Obamas for failing to take local food values much beyond the publicity phase, 
however. See Wenonah Hauter, Dear Obamas: Let’s Move . . . on Food Policy Reform, GRIST 
(Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.grist.org/article/2011-02-11-dear-obamas-lets-move-on-food-
policy-reform. 
 24. Fred Curtis, Eco-Localism and Sustainability, 46 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 83, 83 (2003). 
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ways of life.25 However, economists and environmentalists alike 
recognize that “[r]educing material per capita consumption may be the 
most difficult aspect of eco-localism for many to accept as it 
contravenes the culture of consumerism, the more-is-better assumptions 
of conventional economic theory, existing settlement patterns (cities), 
and the goals of globalization.”26 
The return to localism implicates a number of concepts with deep 
roots in environmental thought.27 The aesthetic justification for 
environmental ethics, for example, can be traced to the intimate 
experiences with nature that writers like George Perkins Marsh, Henry 
David Thoreau, and Aldo Leopold chronicled for the public.28 While 
aesthetic appreciation can also extend to faraway, grand, and exotic 
places, these writers, and many of their latter-day followers, wrote about 
places that (at least to them) were close to home.29 Leopold’s Sand 
County Almanac, though better known for the chapter “The Land 
Ethic,”30 is largely composed of essays describing, in intimate 
naturalistic detail, the seasons on his family’s “sand farm in 
Wisconsin.”31 
Moving beyond aesthetics, communitarian versions of an 
environmental ethic quite naturally rely on the local connection to 
nature. Wendell Berry is perhaps the most well-known popularizer of 
this vein of ecological thought.32 For Berry, work in small agrarian 
communities was both an end in itself and a pathway to an ecologically 
healthier planet.33 In an early critique of industrial agriculture, Berry 
argued that large-scale factory farming would ultimately harm nature 
and humanity; soils and ecosystems would become depleted, and people 
would lose the knowledge of how to cultivate and produce food, 
resulting in dependence on a systems-approach to agriculture that would 
                                                                                                                     
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 92. 
 27. See Ursula K. Heise, Ecocriticism and the Transnational Turn in American Studies, 
20 AM. LITERARY HIST. 381, 384 (2008) (describing localism as “a foundation of environmental 
thought and ethics”). 
 28. See GEORGE PERKINS MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (David Lowenthal ed., Harvard 
Univ. Press 1965) (1864); HENRY DAVID THOREAU, The Ponds, in WALDEN 164 (Beacon Press 
2004) (1854) (making minute observations of local ecology around Walden Pond); see also 
ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (Oxford Univ. Press 1966) (1949). 
 29. Examples of contemporary environmental writers in this aesthetic vein include Terry 
Tempest Williams, who writes about places close to her home in Utah, Bill McKibben, and 
Barbara Kingsolver. See KINGSOLVER, supra note 1; MCKIBBEN, supra note 1; TERRY TEMPEST 
WILLIAMS, REFUGE (1991). 
 30. LEOPOLD, supra note 28, at 237.  
 31. Id. at xviii. 
 32. See generally WENDELL BERRY, BRINGING IT TO THE TABLE: ON FARMING AND FOOD 
passim (2009).  
 33. See id. 
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therefore leave them vulnerable to systemwide failure.34 Berry’s 
antidote was a return to small-scale farming, which he argued would 
address not only problems of food quality and environmental health, but 
also human integrity and dignity:  
Industrial agriculture has tended to look on the farmer 
as a “worker”—a sort of obsolete but not yet dispensable 
machine—acting on the advice of scientists and 
economists. We have neglected the truth that a good farmer 
is a craftsman of the highest order, a kind of artist. It is the 
good work of good farmers—nothing else—that ensures a 
sufficiency of food over the long term.35 
Good farmers, according to Berry, do their work on small, local farms, 
in communities that are at least relatively self-sustaining, where 
subsistence is a guiding principle.36 
Environmental justice (EJ) also implicates localism. The EJ 
movement of the 1980s and ’90s brought attention to the fact that toxic 
and other waste facilities were disproportionately sited in poor and 
minority communities.37 Mainstream environmentalism, despite its 
many successes, had failed to deliver cleaner and healthier 
environments to all communities equally.38 While the EJ movement was 
(and is) diverse and complex, one of its core tenets remains that 
environmentalism means little for disempowered communities if it does 
not touch them locally.39 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See id. at 23–24 (describing several weaknesses of industrial agriculture).  
 35. See id. at 29. 
 36. See id.  
 37. See, e.g., Bunyan Bryant, History and Issues of the Environmental Justice Movement, 
in OUR BACKYARD: A QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3 (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diane M. 
Whitelaw eds., 2003); David H. Getches & David N. Pellow, Beyond “Traditional” 
Environmental Justice, in JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: CONCEPTS, STRATEGIES, AND 
APPLICATIONS 3 (Kathryn M. Mutz et al. eds., 2002); Tom Stephens, An Overview of 
Environmental Justice, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 229 (2003). 
 38. See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL 
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 10 (2001); David Monsma, 
Equal Rights, Governance, and the Environment: Integrating Environmental Justice Principles 
in Corporate Social Responsibility, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 443, 454 (2006) (outlining the 
environmental justice critique). 
 39. See Luke W. Cole, Foreword: A Jeremiad on Environmental Justice and the Law, 14 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. ix, xiii (1995) (“[N]ational [environmental] legal groups have, by history and 
design, a national focus and a legal orientation. This stands in direct contrast to the 
environmental justice movement, which has historically had a local focus and a community 
orientation.”); Carita Shanklin, Comment, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
333, 349 (1997) (“[Grassroots environmental justice groups] have broadened the definition of 
environmentalism to include the quality of life in people’s homes, schools, neighborhoods, 
work, and playgrounds.”). Majora Carter, an environmental justice activist from the South 
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Finally, though not exhaustively, the international environmental 
community adopted localism after it began to examine the root causes 
of global environmental challenges. The United Nations Commission on 
the Environment’s report on sustainable development, known as the 
Brundtland Report, made the connection between local development for 
poor communities and global consumption and pollution.40 The 
“sustainable development” concept has since become tarnished from 
both overuse and underachievement.41 The Brundtland Report 
nonetheless articulated an enduring global justification for localism, 
which is that there will be no solution to the world’s environmental 
problems if we fail to focus on the livelihood and well-being of local 
communities throughout the world.  
B.  The Tragedy of the Atmospheric Commons 
Localism’s roots are deep, and its current revival is broad. Yet there 
remain reasons to be surprised about, and skeptical of, localism’s 
potential to address climate change. The skepticism derives from the 
daunting temporal and spatial barriers to collective action presented by 
climate change. This Section will sketch the features that make climate 
change the mother of all collective action problems.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
Bronx neighborhood of New York City who fought to transform an illegal garbage dump into a 
public park, sums up her view of the EJ movement: 
The environmental groups have little to no presence here. . . . We have to 
reclaim our right to the environmental issue, we have to understand that it’s 
more than just really wealthy white people driving Priuses because they 
can. . . . Why aren’t we at the table helping shape big-picture strategy? . . . The 
debate has to examine how environmental improvements to low-income 
communities lift up the economy, the safety, and the morale—not just locally, 
but regionally and nationally. . . . Things like parks and green roofs and decent 
zoning policies and green-collar jobs and public transportation don’t cost a 
huge amount, but can make a tremendous difference that has long-term 
economic advantages both locally and nationally. 
Amanda Little, Majora League: An Interview with Majora Carter, Founder of Sustainable 
South Bronx, GRIST (Sept. 28, 2006, 5:30 PM), http://www.grist.org/article/m_carter/.  
 40. See Chairman of World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Report of the World Commission 
on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, transmitted to the General Assembly, 
U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987), available at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.  
 41. See James C. Kraska, Global and Going Nowhere: Sustainable Development, Global 
Governance & Liberal Democracy, 34 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 247 (2006); Chris Sneddona 
et al., Sustainable Development in a Post-Brundtland World, 57 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 253, 260 
(2006) (“We can agree . . . that the Brundtland Report, and much of the sustainable development 
discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its sad condition.” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The story of global warming as a particularly intractable commons 
problem is by now well known. In summary, it goes as follows. The 
global atmosphere is a common-pool resource,42 and since 
industrialization, agents have acted in their rational self-interest by 
emitting greenhouse gases in order to benefit from inexpensive energy. 
Even now that we know about the market’s failure to internalize the 
cost of greenhouse gas emissions, rational actors will still opt for cheap 
energy over reductions in greenhouse gas emissions because of the 
possibility that a defector could undermine the regime of curbing 
emissions. Professor Stephen Gardiner argues that global warming is a 
true prisoner’s dilemma, as opposed to any other kind of collective 
action challenge, because it is possible for noncooperators to undermine 
the good produced by a subgroup of cooperators, and it is likely, 
working from the assumption of rational self-interest, that 
noncooperators will have the incentive to do so.43 This is so, according 
to Gardiner, because any one defector from a global regime to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions has the potential to push total global 
emissions above the agreed-upon cap.44 In other words, the problem is 
worse than one in which noncooperators can “free ride” off of others’ 
cooperation. In the global warming context, noncooperators can 
potentially render meaningless (within a rational choice framework) the 
cooperation of others.45 This was the Bush Administration’s rationale 
for backing out of the Kyoto Accords: without China and India 
committing to limitations on emissions, the United States may be 
tightening its carbon belt for nothing.46 This position receives support 
                                                                                                                     
 42. In her important body of work on natural resource commons problems, Professor 
Elinor Ostrom makes several definitional distinctions. She defines “[c]ommons” as “systems, 
such as knowledge and the digital world, in which it is difficult to limit access, but one person’s 
use does not subtract a finite quantity from another’s use.” See Elinor Ostrom, The Challenge of 
Common-Pool Resources, 50 ENV’T 10, 11 (2008). Professor Ostrom defines “common-pool 
resources” as resources that are “sufficiently large that it is difficult, but not impossible, to 
define recognized users and exclude other users altogether. Further, each person’s use of such 
resources subtracts benefits that others might enjoy.” Id. The atmosphere is a common-pool 
resource, as are fisheries and forests. A third category is a joint property commons, like Garrett 
Hardin’s classic sheep pasture. See id.; see also ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: 
THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2–3 (1990). 
 43. See Stephen M. Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
387, 413 (2002) [hereinafter Gardiner, Real Tragedy]; Stephen M. Gardiner, A Perfect Moral 
Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption, 15 
ENVTL. VALUES 397, 400 (2006) [hereinafter Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm]. But see Kirsten H. 
Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate 
Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183 (2005) (arguing that recent collective action literature and 
economic modeling indicate that it is not irrational for large greenhouse gas emitters to act 
unilaterally to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions).  
 44. See Gardiner, Real Tragedy, supra note 43, at 412–13.  
 45. See id.  
 46. Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts 
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from game theory’s account of limiting emissions.  
The temporally dispersed nature of global warming adds yet another 
barrier to a collective solution. As Gardiner puts it, “[h]uman-induced 
climate change is a severely lagged phenomenon.”47 Carbon dioxide 
remains in the atmosphere for centuries, if not longer.48 Compounding 
this, global warming’s effects on natural systems create their own 
feedbacks, resulting in changes occurring long after greenhouse gases 
enter the atmosphere. A study by chemist Susan Solomon and others 
found that changes in surface temperature, rainfall, and sea level are 
largely irreversible for more than a thousand years after emissions 
completely stop entering the atmosphere.49 The deferral of many serious 
climate change effects means that we are faced not merely with a 
present-time (or spatial) collective action problem, but also with a very 
daunting temporal one. The first challenge presented by this lag is one 
of perception. It is understandable that we have a hard time 
experiencing today’s daily activities as contributing to an increasingly 
intractable global problem when the effects of these normal, culturally 
reinforced activities will be felt only decades from now. To put this in 
concrete terms, every time we drive, turn on the lights, use the 
computer, push the button on the clothes dryer, or use any of the other 
myriad carbon-based, fuel-dependent appliances, we are adding to the 
total parts per million of CO2 in the atmosphere. However, we cannot 
see, smell, or feel our emissions. They are not like the particulate matter 
to which everyone can point on a low air-quality day. They do not wash 
up on the shores of our beaches like clots of oil, plastic bags, and 
Styrofoam packing peanuts. Thus we do not perceive the effects of our 
actions, yet they are more enduring than any of these more obvious 
phenomena.50 
 
                                                                                                                     
(Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdf/bush_letter010313.pdf. 
 47. Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm, supra note 43, at 402.  
 48. See IPCC, 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 11, 16 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (“Anthropogenic warming and sea 
level rise would continue for centuries due to the time scales associated with climate processes 
and feedbacks, even if greenhouse gas concentrations were to be stabilised.”); see also James 
Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC 
SCI. J. 217, 226 (2008) (“A large fraction of fossil fuel CO2 emissions stays in the air a long 
time, one-quarter remaining airborne for several centuries.”).  
 49. See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1704 (2009), available at http://www.pnas.org/ 
content/early/2009/01/28/0812721106.full.pdf+html. 
 50. See GERALD T. GARDNER & PAUL C. STERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS & HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 228–29 (2d ed. 2002) (describing the availability heuristic); Elke U. Weber, 
Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global 
Warming Does Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 108–09 (2006) (describing 
hyperbolic discounting). 
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A related challenge is that the temporal lags put us in the position of 
setting targets for emissions based on predictions about the future, 
rather than certainties about the here and now.51 For a time, one such 
prediction was that to avoid reaching average temperature increases 
resulting in potentially catastrophic and irreversible trends, we had to 
stabilize the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere at somewhere 
between 400 and 450 parts per million.52 This presented a sufficiently 
daunting challenge, given that global emissions of CO2 have continued 
to increase since 2000, to 385 ppm.53 More recently, a paper authored 
by climatologist James Hansen and others set the target for avoiding 
catastrophic effects even lower, at only 350 ppm.54 Hansen’s paper is 
equally urgent about the relevant time frame, suggesting that if 
emissions are not brought under control within the next decade, 
“prospects for avoiding a dangerously large, extended overshoot of the 
350 ppm will be dim.”55  
Gardiner terms the temporal aspects of global warming a “pure 
intergenerational problem,” and concludes that “the intergenerational 
analysis will be less optimistic about solutions than the tragedy of the 
commons analysis. For it implies that current populations may not be 
motivated to establish a fully adequate global regime, since, given the 
temporal dispersion of effects . . . such a regime is probably not in their 
interests.”56 To make matters even grimmer, the problem repeats itself 
with each generation, and also worsens for each subsequent generation, 
as the effects multiply over time and the costs of mitigating emissions 
and adapting to climate change increase.57 
In describing the world’s (and particularly the United States’) 
response to global climate change over the last three decades, the 
concept of a tragedy of the atmospheric commons seems apt.58 We do 
                                                                                                                     
 51. For a useful assessment and critique of framing climate policy goals in terms of 
greenhouse gas stabilization, see Maxwell T. Boykoff et al., Discursive Stability Meets Climate 
Instability: A Critical Exploration of the Concept of ‘Climate Stabilization’ in Contemporary 
Climate Policy, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 53 (2010). 
 52. See Hansen et al., supra note 48, at 226; Martin I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology 
Paths to Global Climate Stability: Energy for a Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCIENCE 981, 981 
(2002). 
 53. Hansen et al., supra note 48, at 218. 
 54. See id. at 226. 
 55. Id. at 227. 
 56. Gardiner, Perfect Moral Storm, supra note 43, at 404–05. 
 57. See id. at 405. 
 58. Although I find Gardiner’s account compelling, it is not all that important whether 
Gardiner is correct to label this a true prisoner’s dilemma, or whether the collective action 
problem is better described in some other way. See, e.g., Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 
199–202 (describing the problem as “glass half full,” rather than as a true prisoner’s dilemma). 
Whatever the label, it remains the case that the world’s largest emitters (now the United States 
and China) have yet to reduce their emissions as part of any global regime. 
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not have to accept the assumptions about human nature at the core of 
the rational choice view of collective action problems (and there is an 
important literature that rejects these assumptions59) to recognize that 
despite knowing with increasing certainty that we should curb 
emissions, there currently is no global agreement or enforcement 
regime, and greenhouse gas emissions continue, in general, to rise.60  
C.  Political and Psychological Tragedy 
Complementing (or supplanting, depending on one’s view) the 
rational choice theory for why the world has failed to stabilize 
greenhouse gas emissions, there are compelling explanations rooted in 
power and psychology. Murmurs about “global warming” began to seep 
out to the general public sometime in the 1980s,61 and the problem was 
known to high-level government officials even before that time.62 
Scientific opinion was just beginning to gel during that period, yet early 
media coverage of the issue was confounded by the gap between how 
scientists talked about certainty and the way the public and politicians 
heard and translated scientific terms.63 Complicating public perception 
further, the petroleum industry funded research by several climate 
skeptics, and despite constituting a small minority among scientists, the 
skeptics commanded equal time in the press.64 Thus, rather than present 
a story about steady progress toward scientific certainty, much of the 
media coverage of climate change presented a misleading balance of 
views.65 As a result, public attention wavered, and public confusion 
about global warming persisted even as the science became increasingly 
clear: 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See OSTROM, supra note 42, at 191; see also MICHAEL TAYLOR, RATIONALITY AND THE 
IDEOLOGY OF DISCONNECTION, at xii (2006). 
 60. See James H. Butler, The NOAA Annual Greenhouse Gas Index, NAT’L OCEANIC & 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/aggi/.  
 61. See Spencer Weart, The Public and Climate 27 (July 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.aip.org/history/climate/pdf/Public.pdf. 
 62. See Memorandum from Daniel P. Moynihan to John D. Ehrlichman (Sept. 17, 1969), 
available at http://nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/56.pdf (discussing risk of 
global warming); Memorandum from Hubert Heffner to Daniel P. Moynihan (Jan. 26, 1970), 
available at http://nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/55.pdf (same); Memorandum 
from Daniel P. Moynihan to John D. Ehrlichman (Aug. 13, 1970), available at 
http://nixonlibrary.gov/ virtuallibrary/documents/jul10/57.pdf (same); Moynihan, as Nixon Aide, 
Warned of Global Warming, SEATTLE TIMES (July 10, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/ 
html/nationworld/2012268564_apusnixonlibrarydocuments.html (describing papers recently 
released from the Nixon library indicating that Daniel P. Moynihan urged President Richard M. 
Nixon to begin a program to monitor global carbon dioxide emissions due to the potential threat 
to climate and risks of sea level rise).  
 63. See Weart, supra note 61, at 47–48. 
 64. See id. at 47. 
 65. See id. at 47–48. 
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In the early years of the new century, polls in the 
United States showed an outright decline in concern for 
global warming. Since the late 1980s, a large majority of 
Americans had told poll-takers that they personally worried 
about global warming, but the fraction who claimed they 
worried about it “a great deal”—roughly a third—declined 
in the early 2000s, and by 2004 a bare majority in the 
United State [sic] expressed any worry at all about global 
warming.66 
For a brief period between 2005 and 2008, several factors seemed to 
heighten both awareness and concern about climate change. The fourth 
report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),67 
and increased media discussion of climate change in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina, among other causes, seemed to increase public 
knowledge and concern.68 Yet awareness and concern have failed to 
translate into a widespread sense of urgency. Even more troubling, 
public acceptance that climate change is occurring and is caused by 
human activity has again declined. A study by the Pew Research Center 
for the People and the Press found that public acceptance that climate 
change was occurring dropped from 71% in April 2008 to 57% in 
October 2009.69 During the same period, public acceptance that any 
warming was caused by human activity dropped from 47% to 36%.70 
There are several plausible explanations for this decline. The 2008–
2009 economic meltdown displaced all other issues on the public’s 
priority list, and it likely knocked climate change down a notch or 
two.71 In addition, the psychology of climate change is complex. First, 
cognitive dissonance theory posits that we tend to minimize or discount 
facts or behaviors that are inconsistent with primary beliefs about 
ourselves.72 Cognitive dissonance helps explain why most people tend 
to disregard messages indicating that their normal behaviors, bound up 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 59. 
 67. IPCC, IPCC FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (AR4) (R.K. 
Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ 
ar4/syr/en/ contents.html. 
 68. See John M. Broder, Climate-Change Debate Is Heating Up in Deep Freeze, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at A1; Katrina and Global Warming, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/specialreports/katrina.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
 69. See Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of Global Warming, PEW RES. CENTER FOR 
THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (Oct. 22, 2009), http://people-press.org/report/556/global-warming.  
 70. Id. 
 71. See Frank Newport, Americans: Economy Takes Precedence over Environment, 
GALLUP (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116962/Americans-Economy-Takes-
Precedence-Environment.aspx. 
 72. See Elliot Aronson, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective, in 4 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2–3 (1969).  
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as they are with dependence on carbon emitting activities, contribute to 
a threat to the world as we know it.73 Second, that very framing—a 
threat to the world as we know it—while accurate in many senses, is 
itself part of the problem. Polling data and marketing studies have 
indicated that threatening messages, even if (and perhaps especially if) 
they are accurate, tend to have a deflating effect on most of the public. 
Messages of alarm or emergency, particularly in the context of a 
problem that seems beyond individual redress, tend to result in a sense 
of helplessness or apathy.74 In addition, there are problems associated 
with perception and cognition. According to cognitive psychologists, 
human beings tend to have difficulty valuing the future more than the 
present. Consequently, people have difficulty taking actions today for 
payoffs in their own future lives, let alone the lives of future 
generations.75 Further, we tend to filter information about disputed 
public policy issues through predispositions toward certain core 
values.76 This means that even as the dust settles about key aspects of 
climate change, some people will remain skeptical unless the message is 
delivered by either a trusted messenger or by one who validates core 
aspects of an individual’s values or identity.77  
Finally, it is difficult, psychologically speaking, to keep an issue on 
the front burner that is knowable only through abstractions. Nobody 
experiences climate change directly. What we experience is weather, 
and weather has not yet changed in a steady, observable way that tracks 
(according to our sense impressions) with global warming. We tend to 
overvalue our own perceptions, particularly when so much is at stake in 
terms of setting them aside.78 As writer Spencer Weart observed, “If 
you did accept climate change as something that could affect your own 
                                                                                                                     
 73. See id.; Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia G. Devine, On the Motivational Nature of 
Cognitive Dissonance: Dissonance as Psychological Discomfort, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 382, 392 (1994). 
 74. See Anthony Leiserowitz, Communicating the Risks of Global Warming: American 
Risk Perceptions, Affective Images, and Interpretive Communities, in CREATING A CLIMATE FOR 
CHANGE: COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE  & FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE 44 (Susanne C. 
Moser & Lisa Dilling eds., 2007).  
 75. See Chrisoula Andreou, Environmental Preservation and Second-Order 
Procrastination, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 233, 236 (2007); Dustin J. Penn, The Evolutionary Roots 
of Our Environmental Problems: Toward a Darwinian Ecology, 78 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 275, 284–
85 (2003).  
 76. See Dan Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus,14 J. RISK RES. 147, 
169 (2011). 
 77. See id.; DAN KAHAN ET AL., THE SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY: 
MAKING SENSE OF—AND MAKING PROGRESS IN—THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 3–6 
(2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1017189&.  
 78. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1176 (describing the cognitive psychological barrier to 
understanding climate change as an “unavailability heuristic” resulting in underregulation); 
Jeffrey Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 303.  
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community in your own lifetime, you might feel obliged to change your 
pattern of consumption, and perhaps some political opinions. For many 
people, this was enough to raise mental barriers to further 
consideration.”79 
D.  Tragedy at the Highest Scales of Governance (The Role of the 
State, Part One) 
These intractable features of global warming point to a potentially 
heroic role for the state. Indeed, the need to solve collective action 
problems, and commons problems in particular, provided the grist for 
ecologist Garrett Hardin’s classic account justifying regulation (or some 
alternative version of governmentally imposed coordination) in the 
environmental context.80 The options for the state are more plentiful, 
more consistent with individual liberty, and more attuned to 
psychological barriers than Hardin envisioned;81 nonetheless, his central 
insight regarding the challenges represented by common-pool resources 
remains apt. To save us from ourselves, or more generously, to help us 
collectively realize our common interests, the state must step in and 
inform, coordinate, coerce, nag, incentivize, or penalize us to help us do 
the right things for the long term.82 The persistent calls for federal 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions recognize the irreplaceable state 
role in this regard.83 It is therefore unsurprising that a great deal of 
political, scholarly, and activist effort has focused on national, and 
international, regimes for coordination and enforcement.84  
                                                                                                                     
 79. Weart, supra note 61, at 54–55 (discussing observations by journalists Bill McKibben 
and Andrew Revkin). 
 80. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1245–46 (1968).  
 81. See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (making the case for government interventions 
that shape individual choices to maximize welfare without intruding on liberty). 
 82. For a helpful catalogue of the various collective action dilemmas that call for federal 
government control and coordination in the environmental context, see Robert L. Glicksman & 
Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 579, 616–
37 (2008) (analyzing different collective action problems in the context of whether they justify 
federal ceiling preemption of state efforts to regulate greenhouse gases); see also THALER & 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 81, at 14.  
 83. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1205–31 (discussing design strategies for federal law to 
overcome various and severe temporal and spatial challenges of climate change). 
 84. See FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES 1 (2004); Yasuko Kameyama, The 
Future Climate Regime: A Regional Comparison of Proposals, 4 INT’L ENV’T AGREEMENTS: 
POL., LAW & ECON. 307, 310–12 (2004); Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The 
Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007); see also William Pizer, 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE: A U.S. PERSPECTIVE ON FUTURE CLIMATE REGIMES 1 (2007), 
available at http://rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-07-04.pdf. 
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Thus, there are very few commentators (aside from climate skeptics) 
who do not advocate for some kind of national, and ultimately 
international, emissions control regime.85 Yet such a regime has not 
materialized. To date, there is no federal legislation controlling 
greenhouse gas emissions,86 and none appears to be on the horizon.87 At 
the international level, events in Copenhagen in December 2009 failed 
to produce a binding multilateral treaty,88 and the idea of achieving one 
is on life support, at best. The news is not all bad on these fronts, 
though. Absent mandatory federal emissions limitations, the federal 
government has taken other steps to put a climate change mitigation 
regime in place. Federal legislation has funded climate science and 
clean energy development, and has encouraged technology transfer.89 
Recently, federal agencies have begun to take climate change seriously, 
issuing endangerment findings for greenhouse gases, and taking a range 
of actions to coordinate climate planning and adaptation efforts.90 In the 
                                                                                                                     
 85. Even scholars highlighting the unique contributions that local and state governments 
can make recognize the need for national regulations. See Trisolini, supra note 10, at 745–46; 
Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 233 (concluding that unilateral action by subnational 
governments can make meaningful contributions to climate change, but acknowledging that 
“cooperative international standards . . . remain the optimal framework for addressing global 
commons problems”). 
 86. Federal legislation has addressed some aspects of clean energy development and 
technology transfer, and Congress has funded climate change research. See Climate Change 
Statutory Citations, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/climate 
change/federal.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). Despite episodic momentum for a federal law 
that would put a price on carbon, no such statute has emerged from Congress for presidential 
signature. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate Bill in 
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; see also RACHEL GOLD ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009: IMPACTS OF CURRENT PROVISIONS 
AND OPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE THE LEGISLATION 1 (2009), available at http://cdn.public 
interestnetwork.org/assets/A1T3ezw8Sq4kOKenw2HQqg/E096.pdf; JOHN LARSEN, WORLD RES. 
INST., EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS UNDER POLLUTION REDUCTION PROPOSALS IN THE 111TH 
CONGRESS (2010), available at http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2010-06-08.pdf.  
 87. DEAN SCOTT, WITH NO FEDERAL LEGISLATION ON HORIZON, OFFICIAL SAYS LOCAL 
CLIMATE EFFORTS CONTINUE (2010), available at http://www.naem.org/resource/resmgr/docs/ 
inthenews-localclimate.pdf. 
 88. See JANE LEGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40001, A U.S.-CENTRIC CHRONOLOGY 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS 4–5 (2011), available at http://www. 
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R40001.pdf.  
 89. See NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR., supra note 86.  
 90. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch. 1); Sec. of the Int., Order No. 3289 (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://www.doi.gov 
/archive/climatechange/SecOrder3289.pdf; COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, DRAFT NEPA 
GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERATION OF EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS 1 (2010), available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/Consideration_of_Effects_ 
of_GHG_Draft_NEPA_Guidance_FINAL_02182010.pdf. 
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international arena, the Kyoto accords stimulated Europe’s carbon 
trading and regulation system, and spawned a host of other transregional 
efforts, either directly or indirectly.91 Something has been done at the 
higher levels of coordination—but it is much less than what has been 
repeatedly called for, and it is far less than what is required to stabilize 
the climate. 
E.  The Localization of Climate Law 
Despite (or perhaps due to) relative inaction at the federal level, 
efforts have sprung up at the subnational level.92 Regions, states, and 
cities have undertaken programs to address greenhouse gas emissions 
and to develop renewable energy alternatives.93 State-level activities 
range from maintaining greenhouse gas inventories to implementing 
greenhouse gas emissions limitations.94 California has led these efforts 
by imposing emissions limitations on motor vehicles95 and by 
establishing firm goals for reducing the state’s greenhouse gas 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.96 California’s climate regime now 
consists of caps on emissions by certain industries, a nascent trading 
and offset program, and a timeline for further reducing emissions in 
order to meet emissions reductions goals.97 Cities have also become 
engaged.98 As Professor Katherine Trisolini has documented, cities have 
                                                                                                                     
 91. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 
MEASURES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 2–5 (2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUp 
loads/eu-fact-sheet-12-05-09.pdf (describing measures taken to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions throughout Europe). 
 92. Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 215, 217, 219–23 (describing categories of state 
climate action and theorizing that subnational activities are rationally motivated at least in part 
by desire to undertake symbolic action on a serious problem); see also J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1499, 1521–26, 1528–30 (2007) (analyzing state plans). 
 93. For an overview of state and regional initiatives, see U.S. States and Regions, PEW 
CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011). 
 94. See id.; see also Kevin L. Doran, U.S. Sub-Federal Climate Change Initiatives: An 
Irrational Means to a Rational End?, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 208–10 (2008). 
 95. See Climate Change Emission Control Regulations, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIR 
RES. BD., http://arb.ca.gov/cc/factsheets/cc_newfs.pdf (Dec. 10, 2004); California Vehicle 
Standards, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_ 
done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard-moreinfo.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); see also 
Kevin M. Davis, The Road to Clean Air Is Paved with Many Obstacles: The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency Should Grant a Waiver for California to Regulate Automobile Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Via Assembly Bill 1493, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 39, 40 (2009) (“California 
has taken a leadership role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”). 
 96. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38550, 38561(a)–(c) (West Supp. 2011). 
 97. See Assembly Bill 32: Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
 98. See Maike Sippel & Till Jenssen, What About Local Climate Governance? A Review 
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harnessed their core regulatory powers over matters such as zoning, 
transportation planning, construction, and waste disposal to play what 
may be a crucial role in larger climate mitigation policy.99  
Most intriguingly, in light of the pure intergenerational collective 
action features of climate change and the psychological barriers to 
perceiving and acting on climate change discussed above,100 individuals 
and communities have formed relatively informal local initiatives to 
address climate change.101 Attending to these local efforts makes sense 
for two reasons; one is instrumental, the other is not. First, as Professor 
Michael Vandenbergh and others have discussed, individual attitude and 
behavior change will be an important part of any successful effort to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.102 Local climate action groups are 
composed of “early adopters” of these types of changes, and thus 
provide role models, as well as insight into strategies that might be 
successful for the broader public. Second, the motivations, practices, 
and ethical worldviews articulated by participants in these groups may 
provide a blueprint for individual and community action, even in a 
world where state coordination and enforcement either never fully 
materialize, or do and nonetheless fail to achieve their stated goals.103  
II.  LOCAL CLIMATE ACTION GROUPS: WHAT, HOW, AND WHY 
The political and psychological barriers to widespread public 
concern about global warming may actually help to explain why smaller 
communities started taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
well before climate change made its way onto the national agenda. In 
smaller communities, affinities of value, politics, and culture can 
                                                                                                                     
of Promise and Problems 1, 33 (Inst. of Energy Econ. & Rational Energy Use, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1514334 (noting the “substantial potential” of local governments to 
implement climate protection measures); U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, CITY OF 
SEATTLE 1, http://usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011) (stating that cities throughout the country are working on climate action 
measures). 
 99. See Trisolini, supra note 10, at 694–734. 
 100. See Kahan et al., supra note 76, at 147–48, 152. 
 101. See discussion infra Part II. 
 102. See Gert Cornelissen et al., Cueing Common Ecological Behaviors to Increase 
Environmental Attitudes, in PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY 39, 42 (Wijnand IJsselsteijn et al. eds., 
2006); Pam Scholder Ellen et al., The Role of Perceived Consumer Effectiveness in Motivating 
Environmentally Conscious Behaviors, 10 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 102, 102, 105 (1991); 
Richard D. Katzev & Theodore R. Johnson, A Social-Psychological Analysis of Residential 
Electricity Consumption: The Impact of Minimal Justification Techniques, 3 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
267, 268–69, 271, 283 (1983); Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 7, at 1673, 1675–77, 
1689. 
 103. Ostrom’s advocacy of the polycentric approach stems from the difficulties presented 
by formulating a top-down global solution, as well as the benefits of local engagement. See 
Ostrom, supra note 3, at 23 n.9, 32–33. 
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overcome the epistemological and psychological barriers that inhibit the 
public at large.104 Indeed, the cities that have taken the lead in 
formulating and implementing climate action plans tend to be ones with 
populations whose demographic profiles are the most likely to believe 
that climate change is happening, and rate it as an urgent problem. In 
1993, Portland, Oregon, became the first city to adopt a strategy for 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. In June 2005, Portland issued a 
“Progress Report” which concluded that the city and surrounding 
county had reduced per capita emissions by 12.5% since 1993.105 Other 
cities joined Portland in establishing emissions reduction targets. To 
unite and further catalyze these efforts, Mayor Greg Nickels of Seattle 
created the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA), to 
which there were nine original signatories (all of which might be, with 
the possible exception of Salt Lake City, on Rush Limbaugh’s Most 
Dangerous Places in America list): Boulder, Colorado; Burlington, 
Vermont; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Portland, Oregon; Redmond, 
Washington; Salt Lake City, Utah; Santa Monica, California; San 
Francisco, California; and Seattle, Washington.106 The MCPA urges 
action at the federal and state levels and advocates policies that meet, or 
surpass, the Kyoto target of reducing global warming pollution to 7% 
below 1990-levels by 2012. The Agreement also states that signatory 
mayors will strive to meet or exceed the Kyoto targets within their own 
communities by creating an inventory of emissions in their cities, 
setting reduction targets, and increasing use of alternative energy 
sources.107 More than 1,000 mayors have now signed the agreement.108 
Similarly, more than 500 cities have joined the Cities for Climate 
Protection Campaign (CCP), which is under the auspices of the 
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. CCP cities 
pledge to reduce emissions using agreed-upon criteria and 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See Robert B. Cialdini, Crafting Normative Messages to Protect the Environment, 12 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 105, 109 (2003); P. Wesley Schultz, Changing Behavior 
with Normative Feedback Interventions: A Field Experiment on Curbside Recycling, 21 BASIC 
& APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 31–33 (1998). 
 105. See PORTLAND ONLINE, A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CITY OF PORTLAND AND 
MULTNOMAH COUNTY LOCAL ACTION PLAN ON GLOBAL WARMING 1 (June 2005), http://www.po 
rtlandonline.com/shared/cfm/image.cfm?id=112118. 
 106. See Andre Robert De Fontaine, Taking the Temperature: Investigating the Factors that 
Drive Cities to Join the Mayors Climate Protection Agreement 49–50 (Apr. 16, 2007) 
(unpublished MPP thesis, Georgetown University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences), 
available at http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/1961/4157/1/etd_822542235.pdf. 
 107. U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra note 98. 
 108. See Map of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. CTR., http://www.usmayor 
s.org/climateprotection/map.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (reporting 1,054 participants as of 
Nov. 14, 2011); see also List of Participating Mayors, MAYORS CLIMATE PROT. 
CTR., http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (listing 
names of 1,054 participants). 
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measurements.109 
The initiatives discussed and explored below are even further down 
the scale. In the United States, England, Canada, and elsewhere, groups 
of individuals have come together to create communities centered on 
reducing individual greenhouse gas emissions, increasing public 
awareness, and promoting activism regarding climate change. Rather 
than continuing to theorize about how, and why, such groups form, the 
Sections below discuss the responses of participants in these groups and 
draw on other sources of information that the groups themselves make 
available. 
A.  Local Climate Action Initiatives Up Close110 
1.  A Sunday Afternoon in Boulder, Colorado 
On Sunday, June 14, 2009, at 2:00 p.m., a group of roughly thirty 
people arrived at the home of Dan Friedlander in the Shanahan Ridge 
neighborhood of Boulder, Colorado.111 Shanahan Ridge is on the south 
side of town, perched just below the “Blue Line” that Boulder 
established in the 1950s to ensure that development would creep no 
further into the mountains. The people ranged in age from early 
twenties through sixties, with a few apparently over sixty-five. Most 
were over forty, with just a few twenty- and thirty-somethings. Dress 
was casual; people were not wearing fancy clothes, jewelry, or much 
makeup. They also were not, as one version of a Boulder stereotype 
might have it, tricked out in expensive workout gear with muscles 
bulging through their quick-dry shirts. It was an ordinary-looking 
group—nice, unassuming. They had gathered for the Shanahan Ridge 
Neighbors for Climate Action Tour of Energy Efficient Homes.  
                                                                                                                     
 109. See Trisolini, supra note 10, at 676. While several cities have taken serious steps 
toward achieving the MCPA and CCP goals, for most, the efforts remain fairly symbolic. 
However, the nine original cities that were signatories to the MCPA have each taken measures 
that move beyond the symbolic, as have Berkeley and San Francisco. See De Fontaine, supra 
note 106, at 49. The general lack of practical efforts is understandable, though, in that city 
governments are limited in their ability to address some core aspects of energy, transmission, 
and pollution control policy. See Engel & Saleska, supra note 43, at 200–01, 215; Hari M. 
Osofsky, Climate Change Legislation in Context, 102 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 245, 247–48 
(2008); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Coven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Climate Change 
Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409, 413 (2008). Cities can, however, affect patterns of energy 
consumption, promote energy efficiency, and create programs designed to encourage alternative 
transportation. Cf. Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 253, 280 (2009) (arguing that cities can play significant roles in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions through land use planning, transportation infrastructure, and green building 
requirements); Trisolini, supra note 10, at 695. 
 110. The dialogue featured in this Section was paraphrased from the author’s notes. 
 111. Notes from Tour of Energy Efficient Homes (June 14, 2009) (on file with author). The 
descriptions and quotations in this Subsection are all from this source. 
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Don Allen’s house, just a few doors down the street, was the first 
stop on the tour. The featured item was blown-in insulation. As he 
described the process of injecting foam insulation into the space 
between the exterior and interior walls of his home, Don, who appeared 
to be in his seventies, was dressed in crisp khaki shorts and a navy polo 
shirt. He pointed out the small holes that had been cut out of the exterior 
walls, and then plastered and painted over. Questions from the crowd 
ensued, and Don did his best to answer them all: “What happened to the 
previous insulation?” “It gets pushed aside by the cellulose that is blown 
in.”; “Does it feel warmer?” “It does not feel warmer, but the furnace 
does not have to stay on as much to keep it just as warm.”; “What is the 
R-factor of the insulation?” Don did not know the answer to that one; 
and finally, “How much did it cost?” “Roughly $1,200.” Don also had 
solar photovoltaic (PV) panels on his roof; however, these were not the 
focus of this stop on the tour. Don described the process he undertook to 
decide which energy saving and power generating changes to make to 
his home. He first got an energy audit and then decided what steps to 
take from there.  
The second stop on the tour was around the corner, at Henry 
Mueller’s house. Henry’s home featured solar panels which laid flat to 
the roof and faced east. “I chose to have them face east, and lie flush to 
the roof, rather than raise them for the southern exposure. This was 
solely an aesthetic choice. I’m an architect, and I do not like the look of 
the raised panels. They make the house seem like an engineering feat 
rather than a home.” Unlike Don Allen, Henry installed his solar panels 
before getting a home energy audit, but realized that he should have 
done things in reverse order. “The home is a 1970s McStain home,” 
Henry told the group, “and has common McStain problems, such as 
two-by-four construction, which allows only R-11 to R-13 insulation in 
the walls. Crawl spaces are not insulated; the house has an inefficient 
joint structure, with lots of angles, which makes for lots of leakage.” For 
the solar panels, Henry received a 3.98 per watt rebate from Excel 
(Boulder’s electric utility company), a rebate which might have been 
higher but for his choice to have the panels face east rather than south. 
Still, he now generates more energy than he uses with his 4.92 kilowatt 
system. One advantage of the east-facing panels is that they have a 
chance to cool off, making them operate more efficiently. Henry 
described the other changes he made to increase the energy efficiency of 
his home: window quilts on the interior of the windows, which retain 
heat during cold weather and insulate against it in the summer (“You 
can order them or get kits at Joanne’s Fabrics,” one of the tour leaders 
volunteered.); exterior shutters, which reflect the heat during the day 
(“My green building guru swears by them,” Henry added.); and an 
evaporative cooler mounted on the exterior of the house, which uses 
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one-third of the energy a traditional air conditioner uses (“Excel has 
rebates on evaporative coolers.”). Henry continued: 
Regarding windows, you get the most R-value for 
medium-insulating windows plus window quilts or other 
interior or exterior insulation, as opposed to the highest 
insulating, most expensive windows, which cost more but 
do not do a better job of reflecting heat in summer or 
retaining it in winter as my combination approach.  
The group shuffled off, and some members quickly jotted down notes of 
the many tips Henry had shared.  
The third stop, Judy Beler’s home, demonstrated an energy audit in 
action. Eric, the energy auditor, explained that when he does an energy 
audit, he first looks at everything in the structure of the home (such as 
insulation and sealing), then he assesses the appliances, and finally, he 
examines energy sources. Eric led the tour group to Judy’s basement to 
check out her water heater. Several members of the tour crammed into 
the closet-sized space, while the rest peered in from the stairway. The 
water heater’s copper pipes had been wrapped with insulation. 
“Builders need to learn to do this,” commented Eric. Next, he described 
the inefficiencies of the heater itself. “Old water heaters waste lots of 
energy because they heat the huge tank first. You can lower energy use 
first by lowering the temperature on your water heater.” Eric cut 
through the crowd and led the tour group back upstairs. “In terms of 
insulation, the Department of Energy suggests R-18 for walls and R-38 
for cathedral ceilings,” Eric said, while pointing at Judy’s walls and 
high living room ceiling. Eric then demonstrated an audit test that 
sucked the air out of the house to see where the leaks were located. A 
large reverse fan was mounted in a living room window, and Eric held 
an infrared camera to locate the leaky spots. Members of the tour moved 
around Judy’s living room and dining room, putting their hands in front 
of electric sockets, wall joints, and fireplaces. “You can feel the air 
coming in here,” commented one member of the group, hand poised 
near a socket. Judy and Eric also pointed out Judy’s Home Energy 
Monitor (also known as a Power Cost Monitor), which shows how 
much energy you are using at any given moment and from what 
sources. “These are available at McGuckin’s for $180. Just seeing how 
much energy you use, and seeing how it can go down with little things, 
helps save energy,” commented Eric. “Identifying how much you use 
helps a lot—I reduced my energy consumption by 8% just with this 
monitor,” added Judy.  
After Judy’s, the official three-home tour was over, and the group 
headed back to Dan Friedlander’s house for a reception. Dan’s living 
room has floor-to-ceiling windows on the east side, providing a 
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panoramic, almost vertigo-inducing view of Boulder as the city tumbles 
downhill and then fades into the plains. Asphalt ribbons line the way 
toward Denver. “What kind of windows do you have?” inquired one of 
the visitors. “The highest insulating ones. We wanted the view, and the 
window provides passive solar light and heat, so for us it was a good 
balance.” The guests milled about, snacking on fruit, cheese, and 
crackers and asking follow-up questions of the people whose homes had 
been on the tour. After a few minutes, Dan hushed the crowd to make 
some remarks:  
We want to change the world . . . [, but] it is not easy to 
change the world. We can do it by first changing our 
relationships with each other. We live in a suburb, let’s be 
honest about that, and suburbs can be very, very 
depersonalizing, bad for our moral sense and bad for our 
ability to relate to one another. . . . We have been through a 
process led by Larry to focus on balancing between the 
community and global warming. When Judy asks you to 
volunteer for a few hours, we want to build a stronger 
community . . . we don’t want it to feel like something else 
you have to do, we want it to be valuable for you 
too . . . we want it be morally and personally 
valuable. . . . You change the world by changing your 
construction of the world around you . . . which is your 
own community. 
When Dan was finished, Henry Mueller took the floor. “We, the 
Shanahan Neighborhood for Climate Action, are examples for the other 
groups forming throughout the city of Boulder. Boulder is an example 
for the whole country. So what we are doing here really is making a 
difference.”  Dan then followed up again: “How do you form 
community? It is an uphill battle, so give a big hand to the folks who 
volunteered their homes today. Then raise your hand to be the next to 
help out.” Dan then paired those who had raised their hands with an 
active member of the group to provide them with a contact and support 
to reinforce their impulse to get involved. A third person, a cohost of the 
event who had been minding the drink table, then spoke: “I am Larry 
Bangs, and I want to add that it is not just about volunteering. We also 
want to get to know each other. We want to have fun! We want to 
reinvigorate a sense of neighborliness and community. You don’t have 
to work; we just want to get to know you.” Beth Powell, a Boulder 
employee implementing the city’s ClimateSmart program, whose 
mandate includes supporting neighborhood efforts, added a few words: 
“People from twenty-eight neighborhoods have contacted me to start 
their own groups. Shanahan has led the way.”  
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The event came to a conclusion, and visitors took cards, bought 
“Shanahan Neighbors for Climate Action” organic cotton T-shirts, and 
asked some final questions. One guest asked Dan, one of the founders 
of the Shanahan Ridge group and a clear leader on these issues, about 
his motivations. He replied: 
Carbon is a poison. Efficiency is one way to address it. 
Also, conservation and creating new sources of energy, 
through renewable sources, have to happen. Efficiency is 
not going to solve the problem alone. We can’t think that or 
we will become disillusioned, but it is a major part, and we 
can control it and lead by example. That’s why we are 
starting here. We can do something, and at the same time 
we can build an engaged community. 
2.  Building Community: Tearing Down the Old Energy Economy? 
The Shanahan Ridge Neighbors for Climate Action is one of several 
types of local groups that have organized around the goal of doing 
something about climate change. The Tour of Energy Efficient Homes 
is one of the events that the Shanahan Ridge group produced in the last 
few years, and other neighborhood groups in Boulder are beginning to 
follow suit. In other cities that are also members of the Mayors Climate 
Action Plan, similar groups have formed, or are now forming.112 Even 
in some places where the surrounding community is less involved, 
climate action groups of varying degrees of formality have coalesced. In 
addition, a movement known as Carbon Rationing Action Groups 
(CRAGs) has taken hold in England. CRAGs are the most intense 
versions of neighborhood groups, organized around providing 
accountability for individual emissions reductions.113 The CRAG 
scheme, described in detail below, is a small-scale version of a per 
capita emissions regime.114  
These groups can be viewed through a variety of different lenses, all 
of them relevant to the quandary of addressing climate change. First, 
under any scenario for stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases within 
the range of acceptable concentration levels, reductions in individual 
and household energy use are part of the solution.115 This is particularly 
                                                                                                                     
 112. See Carolyn Jones, Berkeley Nudging Residents to Cut the Carbon, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 
20, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/20/BA3 
J15C3EC.DTL. 
 113. See Andy Ross, CRAGs: A Short Guide, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS (July 
24, 2006), http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-a-short-guide?. 
 114. Id.  
 115. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 5, at 971; Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 
7, at 1695 (recommending reduced energy consumption, whether through efficiency gains or 
behavior changes, as part of the solution); see also MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON 
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true in the United States, which in 2009 had the second highest per 
capita rate of emissions of all the countries studied by the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency.116 Social psychology literature 
supports the general notion that neighborhood groups can play an 
important role in fostering attitude and behavior change,117 and whether 
consciously or not, many of the strategies found to be successful in 
psychological studies have been internalized (in varying degrees) by 
these groups.118 Local climate action groups are therefore a living 
experiment in strategies for reducing individual energy consumption. 
Second, and less directly instrumental, the highly motivated individuals 
who are involved in these groups can shed light on the values, norms, 
and identities that support taking action against the mother of all 
collective action problems. Third, as Part III discusses, these groups 
may be cultivating the values and norms necessary to live in a world 
that has failed to rein in climate change. 
3.  A Brief Word on Methodology 
My assessment of local climate action groups was qualitative, 
attempting to reveal what participants had to say about what they were 
doing and why they were doing it, rather than to unearth hard data about 
emissions reductions. (While that would be interesting information, it 
would be a different study and result in a different paper.) To assess the 
what, how, and why of local climate action, I conducted interviews by 
e-mail, in person, or over the telephone. In addition, I collected similar 
information from individuals’ self-reporting on Web sites and in 
discussion groups. I asked participants about their background; their 
history of other environmental or political activism; their motivations 
                                                                                                                     
ENVTL. QUALITY, RECOVERY THROUGH RETROFIT 1, 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.white 
house.gov/assets/documents/Recovery_Through_Retrofit_Final_Report.pdf (recommending use 
and coordination of stimulus funds to create jobs and spur investment in increasing home energy 
efficiency). 
 116. See J.G.J. OLIVIER & J.A.H.W. PETERS, NETHERLANDS ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, 
NO GROWTH IN TOTAL GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS IN 2009, at 6, tbl.3.1 (2010), available at 
http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/500212001.pdf (stating the United States per capita 
emissions in 2009 were 17.2 metric tons, with only Australia having a higher rate, of 18.8 metric 
tons per capita). 
 117. See STEWART BARR, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY: SUSTAINABILITY, POLICY AND THE 
CITIZEN 247 (2008) (noting the importance of community support for environmental behavior); 
Schultz, supra note 104, at 25–26. 
 118. The groups’ structures and activities include a variety of strategies and techniques that 
have been found to encourage attitude and behavior change, including affirmation, attribution, 
cueing, and pledges. See Cornelissen et al., supra note 102, at 39–43 (describing effectiveness 
of cueing strategies); Katzev & Johnson, supra note 102, at 283 (describing effectiveness of 
pledges); Richard Miller et al., Attribution Versus Persuasion as a Means for Modifying 
Behavior, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 430, 433 (1975) (describing effectiveness of 
attribution versus persuasion in encouraging environmental behavior change). 
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for reducing their carbon footprint; any particular catalysts that pushed 
them to take action; the actions they had taken to reduce their individual 
emissions; their perception of the role that the neighborhood group or 
CRAG played in their individual actions; their knowledge about 
geoengineering solutions119 and their opinions about these solutions; 
their sense of optimism about the future; and their explanation of their 
actions if they were not optimistic about the future.120 The rationale for 
the first questions—background, history of other activism, motivations, 
actions, and effects of group participation—is obvious. These questions 
relate directly or indirectly to the object of study—what people are 
willing to do on their own or in small groups to reduce their greenhouse 
gas emissions, and why they are willing to do it. The surveys included 
the geoengineering question for two reasons: First, it sheds light on the 
depth of knowledge that participants have about the issues surrounding 
climate change. (It is a proxy, in some sense, for levels of engagement 
about the issue.) Second, it might also deepen our understanding of the 
participants’ motivations and outlook in a way that they might not 
express directly. Similar to reactions to nuclear power as a low-carbon 
alternative (about which the survey did not ask), I hypothesized that 
reactions to geoengineering might correlate with background values of 
anti-growth (if anti-geoengineering) versus technological optimism and 
pro-growth (albeit sustainable growth) if in favor. The extent to which 
this appeared to be the case is discussed below. Finally, the questions 
about optimism were seeking to deepen the explanation of motivations. 
These questions probed whether participants had thought about the 
potential futility of their actions, and if so, how they explained to 
themselves why they were taking these actions anyway. The hope in 
asking these questions was that this would lead to more philosophical 
answers than merely asking about motivations alone, and also that the 
responses might shed some light on debates about altruism, happiness, 
and related meaning-of-life topics. 
4.  Carbon Rationing Action Groups 
a.  Background 
Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGs), which began in 
England, are composed of groups of people who have committed 
                                                                                                                     
 119. Geoengineering is “the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s climate 
system, in order to moderate global warming.” ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: 
SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY ix (Sept. 2009). Methods include carbon dioxide 
removal (such as ocean seeding and carbon storage) and solar radiation management (such as 
aerosol spraying and reflective apparati). Id. at 47. 
 120. See NCAG and CRAG Questionnaires (on file with author).  
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themselves to reducing their individual carbon footprints.121 The main 
aims of the CRAG scheme are: 
To make us all aware of our personal CO2 footprint;  
To find out if [the CRAG scheme] can help us make radical 
cuts in our personal CO2 emissions[;] 
To help us argue for (or against!) the adoption of similar 
schemes at a national . . . and/or international (C&C) 
level[;] 
To build up solidarity between a growing community of 
carbon conscious people[; and] 
To share practical lower-carbon-living knowledge and 
experience.122 
In England, the average citizen contributed 5.4 metric tons of CO2 
emissions to the atmosphere in 2003.123 The CRAG assumption is that 
“a sustainable level of personal CO2 emissions may be as low as about 
0.6 [metric tons] . . . a 90% reduction from [2003.]”124 To reach this 
level by 2030, which might be necessary to “avoid dangerous and 
potentially runaway climate change,” requires a rate of emissions 
reductions of 10% per year.125 There are five categories that make up 
individual CO2 emissions: air travel, household heating, car use, 
household electricity consumption, and public transportation.126 With 
this as the background, the CRAG method is to have individual CRAG 
members set annual emissions targets based on four of the five 
categories, excluding public transportation for simplicity. The personal 
carbon ration for each group member is set by consensus at the 
beginning of each “carbon year.”127 Members report to the group’s 
“carbon accountant” the basics of their living circumstances—whether 
they live alone or with others; how their home is heated; whether 
electricity comes from any renewable resources; whether other 
household members are CRAG members; whether they own a car—so 
that their CO2 is accurately counted. The carbon accountant then 
establishes a “carbon account” for the CRAG member, who reports her 
carbon-emitting activities (energy bills, plane travel, etc.) to the 
accountant throughout the year so that her account can be properly 
                                                                                                                     
 121. See Andy Ross, CRAGs a Short Guide, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS (July 24, 
2006), http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-a-short-guide. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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debited.128 Sometime during the first quarter of the carbon year, the 
CRAG decides on a rate per kilogram of CO2. If at the end of the carbon 
year, a member has exceeded her ration, she has to pay a “carbon debt” 
to the group, based on the agreed-upon rate.129 The funds may be used 
to reward those who have met or exceeded their goal, invested in causes 
chosen by the group, or used by the group to buy offsets in the 
European market.130  
There are currently twenty-six active CRAGs that have set their 
rules and started at least one carbon year—twenty in the United 
Kingdom, four in the United States, and one each in Canada and China; 
additionally, there are thirteen startup CRAGs which are still recruiting, 
or have not set their rules or started their carbon year—eleven in the 
United Kingdom, two in the United States, and one in Canada.131 
Perhaps because their goals are so lofty and their scheme of individual 
carbon quotas seems extreme, CRAGs have received a fair amount of 
media coverage. NPR, BBC, CBS News, and other media outlets have 
reported on CRAGs. Their members have been quoted about their 
carbon savings, the group dynamic, and their personal motivations.132 In 
addition, some CRAG members, when contacted, indicated that other 
researchers had also contacted them and asked them for various kinds of 
information. Despite this, no other publication has addressed the 
motivational, affective, and behavioral questions discussed below. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Some (More?) Thoughts on Using the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, CARBON 
RATIONING ACTION GROUPS (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/fora/threads/so 
me-more-thoughts-on-using-the-eu-emissions-trading-scheme (discussing idea of purchasing 
offsets outside of the CRAG group instead of trading carbon within it to maximize total 
emissions reductions). 
 131. See CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbonrationing 
.org.uk/groups?country=global (showing CRAGs on a global scale) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); 
CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/groups 
?country=uk (showing the number of active CRAGs in the United Kingdom) (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011); CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbon 
rationing.org.uk/groups?country=us (showing the number of active CRAGs in the United 
States) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, 
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/groups?country=ca (showing the number of active CRAGs 
in Canada) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011); CRAG Groups, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, 
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/groups?country=cn (showing the number of active CRAGs 
in China) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
 132. See CRAGs in the Media, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbon 
rationing.org.uk/wiki/crags-in-the-media? (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
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b.  Responses 
i.  Motivations and Catalysts 
CRAG members identified a range of motivations for limiting their 
own carbon emissions. One respondent reported being motivated by a 
general concern about global warming and a desire to “do something 
about [it] and help other people to act in a way that would generate 
consciousness for a larger movement.”133 Another stated that, although 
he has been “a green” for twenty years, “carbon emissions and climate 
change is [sic] the biggest challenge we face.”134 Another reported that 
“two books and a march” motivated him to found UK CRAGs.135 One 
of the books, High Tide, “brings disturbing news from a warming 
world,” and the other, How We Can Save the Planet, “explains the idea 
of carbon rationing.” Another CRAG member described her motivations 
as twofold: First, “it’s hypocritical to argue for global and national 
reductions unless I make personal reductions too.”136 Second, 
“managing my own footprint is the best way of learning more about the 
challenges and solutions.”137 For another, the predominant motivator 
was the appeal of the CRAG method: “We obviously need effective 
carbon policies, and rationing was looking disturbingly like the only 
feasible and somewhat equitable option.”138 
In summary, the motivations reflect a desire to make headway on 
what participants see as an urgent problem, to lead others by example 
and inspiration, to live consistently with environmental and other moral 
values, and to participate in a process that seems fair and right. Some 
respondents also referred to books or other sources of factual 
information as catalysts. 
ii.  Individual Behavior Changes and Their Efficacy 
The individual actions taken by CRAG members to reduce their 
carbon footprints are often quite dramatic. One respondent heats his 
home with two smoke-free woodstoves, which he fuels with found 
waste wood; does not own a car; uses a bicycle, walks, or uses public 
transportation to travel; does not fly (and has not flown since 1997); 
                                                                                                                     
 133. Interview with Shannon Moore, Maryland CRAG Founder (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file 
with author). 
 134. Interview with John Cossham, UK CRAG Member (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
 135. E-mail from Andrew Ross, Founder of UK CRAGs, to Sarah Krakoff (Aug. 28, 2008, 
11:49 AM) (on file with author). 
 136. See Interview with Angela Raffle, Member of Redland-Bristol CRAG (Oct. 19, 2009) 
(on file with author). 
 137. Id. 
 138. See Despina, CRAG User Profiles, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www. 
carbonrationing.org.uk/user/despina (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
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uses little electricity and gas due to A-rated appliances and use of a 
woodstove to heat hot water for baths and cooking; and engages in a 
range of other low-impact behaviors that do not register in his CRAG 
accounting, but contribute nonetheless to overall emissions 
reductions.139 This respondent reported that his emissions, for the most 
recent year for which his CRAG had accounted, were 0.45 metric tons 
(less than one-tenth of the U.K. average).140 
Another respondent sold his car, gave up flying, moved closer to 
family, changed his job to work on projects that required less travel, and 
moved from his own home into a shared flat. His annual emissions have 
gone down 80% since 2006 (from 7.3 metric tons in 2006–2007 to 1.3 
metric tons the following carbon year).141 
Similarly, someone who described herself as a “professional woman 
with [a] busy job” as a medical practitioner had gone “car-free” and 
stopped flying in 2005. She also put solar water heating panels on her 
roof and stopped heating the whole house, instead keeping “one or two 
rooms” cozy. She and her family also “totally changed” their shopping 
habits by growing more fruits and vegetables and joining a community 
orchard.142  
Another respondent’s adjustments were less extreme. She drives 
less, turns off lights when she is not in the room, turns off her heating 
and cooling during the day, and lives close to her job. Still, she reports 
that she uses 50% less electricity per year than most people and also 
uses far less fuel for heat: “For that, I get to cut my carbon emissions by 
about a third.”143 She did not yet have the estimate from her CRAG’s 
first full year, however.144 
The behavior changes described above reflect the range of actions 
taken by CRAG members generally. These actions include giving up 
airline travel; giving up or greatly reducing automobile travel; making a 
range of efficiency improvements to one’s home; choosing to live with 
others rather than alone; growing some or a great deal of one’s own 
food; changing one’s source of electricity and heat to solar or other less 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See Interview with John Cossham, supra note 134. The CRAG only registers the 
categories of personal emissions. Mr. Cossham also grows most of his own food; hardly ever 
eats out or gets take-out food; collects what food he does not grow from food that would 
otherwise be thrown away; has a compost toilet that uses sawdust; and “campaigns tirelessly for 
people to make changes in their lifestyle.” Id. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. Like John Cossham, Mr. Ross also 
reported behavior changes that are not directly related to his personal carbon emissions, but that 
likely reduce overall emissions, including eating local and discarded foods and buying “less new 
stuff.” Id. 
 142. See Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136.  
 143. See Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133.  
 144. Id. 
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carbon-intensive sources; and changing one’s eating habits to consume 
less carbon-intensive foods.145 
iii.  Importance of the Group in Spurring Personal Reductions 
CRAG members answered questions about the role the CRAG 
played in spurring them on toward personal emissions reductions, and 
also what else, if anything, the group dynamic adds. Some respondents 
indicated that they thought they would take many of the actions they 
took regardless but indicated that the CRAG helped to provide 
accountability and morale. Some also took satisfaction in the example 
that they could set for the group, and that the group, in turn, could set 
for others. As one respondent put it, “[W]e are creating an example.”146 
Another cited the benefits of the group dynamic itself, saying that one 
of his aims was to “build up solidarity between a growing community of 
carbon conscious people.”147  
Others saw the CRAG as crucial to their personal actions. The group 
is “[v]ery effective, wouldn’t have made these changes without it, 
makes it fun and [creates] solidarity.”148 Another commented similarly 
that the CRAG motivated her household to make “fairly cheap, easy, 
and efficient home insulation measures” and also to seek out a grant for 
further work in their house. “[Thank you] CRAG, and shame on the 6 of 
us for not being quicker off the mark.”149 This CRAG member also 
editorialized that “[e]xchanging tips with other people who were also 
striving to cut on their carbon . . . seemed like a good idea, but I hadn’t 
appreciated at the time just how valuable a resource my fellow 
CRAGgers would turn out to be! And nice too.”150 
iv.  Assessment of Emissions Reductions: Quantity and Quality 
Unsurprisingly, CRAG participants rated themselves as very 
successful at reducing their personal carbon footprint. As noted above, 
several participants calculate their emissions at well below their 
country’s average, sometimes by as much as one-seventh of average 
annual individual emissions. In terms of reducing their individual 
emissions, CRAG members report reductions ranging from 30% to 80% 
of previous emissions levels.151 
                                                                                                                     
 145. See Responses from CRAG Members (on file with author); People, CARBON 
RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/people (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2011).  
 146. Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133. 
 147. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. 
 148. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136. 
 149. Despina, supra note 138.  
 150. Id. 
 151. See Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133 (reporting reductions of one-
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Several CRAG members touted the individual ration method in 
particular. As one described it: 
My carbon allowance is becoming a secondary 
currency that informs all sorts of day-to-day decisions. It 
shows you the limits of sustainability, but leaves you free 
to decide how to spend your allowance—libertarian carbon 
reduction! It also highlights the most productive areas of 
your footprint to tackle, and the effectiveness of different 
actions or technologies.152  
Another member put it this way: “The sooner carbon becomes just 
like money the better. All the arguing about flying and 4x4’s will stop 
and people can choose how they spend their carbon, just as they 
currently do with money.”153  
On the other hand, Andrew Ross, the founder of the UK CRAGs 
movement, now believes that individual carbon rationing is too 
bureaucratic to implement at anything other than a local level: “I think 
‘downstream’ carbon accounting systems at either the national or 
international level are unnecessarily bureaucratic. Upstream proposals 
seem much more workable (e.g. ‘cap and share’ or ‘cap and dividend’). 
They retain the incentives towards lower carbon consumption but do not 
require the setting up of a parallel currency.”154 While the mutual 
support and accountability of CRAGs contribute to their success as 
neighborhood groups, Ross is dubious that the accounting mechanisms 
necessary to make individual carbon rationing work would translate 
well on a broad scale.155 In addition, Ross believes that a national or 
international cap-and-share approach would more quickly converge “to 
equal per capita shares rather than a convergence over some negotiated 
period.”156 (A cap-and-share or cap-and-dividend approach would set a 
                                                                                                                     
third); E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135 (reporting reductions of approximately 80%). 
 152. David Bassendine, CRAG User Profiles, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, 
http://www.carbonrationing.org.uk/user/david (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).  
 153. Bruce, CRAG User Profiles, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.carbon 
rationing.org.uk/user/bruce (last visited Nov. 14, 2009); hard copy on file with author.  
 154. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. But see Amy Sinden, Revenue-Neutral 
Cap and Trade, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,944 (2009) (advocating a “fair-share cap and trade” 
approach to national carbon regulation, under which tradable emissions allowances would be 
issued to individual consumers, as opposed to industry, who could sell them to fossil fuel 
producers and importers). While not the same as a national individual carbon ration program, 
Professor Sinden’s proposal might replicate some of the excessive bureaucracy problems that 
Ross identifies. Professor Sinden acknowledges this concern, and as an alternative also 
advocates the simpler “cap-and-dividend” approach embraced by Ross. See id. 
 155. See E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135; see also Response of Andrew Ross 
(Oct. 26, 2009) (on file with author). 
 156. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. 
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national or international cap on greenhouse gas emissions, auction off 
the allowances to emitters, and then distribute the dividends to 
individuals on an equal per capita basis.)  
In addition to the quantitative assessments of their efforts, CRAG 
members commented on how the changes affected their quality of life. 
The reports were uniformly positive. One CRAG member (the busy 
professional woman quoted above) reported that she had “[l]earned a 
lot, [and] life is much better for it.”157 Her positive reactions to the 
changes she and her family made appeared to be bound up in her sense 
of living consistently with her values: “[It has] helped my ability to lead 
on this stuff in [the] workplace too, and if I get interviewed on [the] 
telly then they can’t attack me for being a hypocrite . . . .”158 Similarly, 
another CRAG member, responding to the question about the 
effectiveness of his individual actions, wrote: “I know from within that I 
have a highly ethical, albeit slightly unusual, lifestyle.”159 Another 
cheerily reported that his personal emissions reduction from 6.14 to 3.4 
metric tons from one year to another was achieved “with no wearing of 
hair shirts!”160 And another stated that “[i]n general, happiness seems 
inversely-related to size of your income (and carbon footprint!).”161 
v.  Views About Geoengineering Solutions 
The CRAG respondents were skeptical about geoengineering 
options, yet open to the possibility that they might be a necessary part of 
the suite of solutions. One CRAG member was concerned about 
“negative secondary consequences,” but thought that, given the decay 
curve of CO2, “it’s in our best interest to investigate options.”162 
Another rated ocean-seeding very low on the list of acceptable options 
but was open-minded about certain forms of carbon sequestration. 
However, he ultimately much preferred “investment in renewable 
energy generation and reducing demand. If there is a finite pot of money 
to deal with the problem, it should be spent on those things rather than 
hair-brained ideas[,] . . . although some research should still be directed 
at these in case they might be part of the solution.”163 Yet another said 
that he suspects “we will need all the help we can get,” but is also aware 
that “many so-called ‘solutions’ have resulted in more problems in need 
of more solutions.”164 Another said, “I think it’s a mistake to wait for [a] 
                                                                                                                     
 157. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Interview with John Cossham, supra note 134.  
 160. Bruce, supra note 153. 
 161. Bassendine, supra note 152. 
 162. Interview with Shannon Moore, supra note 133. 
 163. Interview with John Cossham, supra note 134. 
 164. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. 
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magic bullet[;] we need to reduce[.]”165 One CRAG member held a 
completely negative view, saying he was “against geo-engineering,” 
though even he described such ideas as “well meaning in intent but not 
getting at the heart of the problem, which is excess consumption.”166 
Thus, to the extent that CRAG members expressed views about 
geoengineering, they ranged from open-minded yet cautious, to wholly 
negative.  
vi.  Degree of Optimism: How Optimism or Pessimism Informs 
Assessment of the Worth of Individual and Small Group Action 
Not all CRAG respondents answered this question, in part due to the 
fact that it was added to the questionnaire after some CRAG members 
had already been interviewed. One who did include a response wrote:  
I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic although I am 
sure we need to take a precautionary approach. We know 
that as a species we are currently having a massive negative 
impact on our environment and life on earth in general but 
there is so much more we do not know. It is my 
guess . . . that it is the unknown unknowns that will 
probably [be] more important in the end!167  
Another said that she thought that “peak oil and economic collapse 
will have an impact on the pattern that global human behavior takes, 
what will happen to climate is hard[er] to predict[.]”168 One person 
described himself as wavering “between righteous anger and great hope 
for humanity and the world.”169 Another one said more definitively that 
he was not optimistic: “Problems have solutions. This is a predicament; 
predicaments only have coping strategies.” He described his 
community’s coping strategies as engaging in “[p]ermaculture,” 
“voluntary simplicity,” and also planting trees that are “more 
comfortable hundreds of miles . . . south.”170 This person also thinks 
that “we will learn to live without affluence. Most people are in denial 
and think they can buy their way out of the problem . . . .” He thinks 
that he “is paving the way towards a new way of living sufficiently in 
the future, when it will be necessary to do so.”171 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136. 
 166. Response of Jan Steinman (Oct. 21, 2009) (on file with author). 
 167. E-mail from Andrew Ross, supra note 135. 
 168. Interview with Angela Raffle, supra note 136. 
 169. Blane Friest, CRAG User Profile, CARBON RATIONING ACTION GROUPS, http://www.c 
arbonrationing.org.uk/user/ddmemissions (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
 170. Response of Jan Steinman, supra note 166. 
 171. Id. 
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5.  Neighborhood Climate Action and Sustainability Groups 
a.  Background 
There are many groups that could arguably fit into the more 
nebulous category of a Neighborhood Climate Action Group (NCAG). 
The formality of the CRAGs and their commitment to group and 
individual reductions, complete with accounting systems and a day of 
reckoning, render them easy to categorize as local carbon-mitigation 
groups. When these formal hallmarks are lacking, however, it becomes 
difficult to distinguish between local groups committed to green living 
in general and those committed to action on climate change. My 
admittedly arbitrary line, then, was whether the group self-identified, 
either at its origin or today, as primarily committed to affecting climate 
change.  
b.  Responses 
i.  Motivations and Catalysts 
Participants in NCAGs expressed a range of motivations and 
catalysts. Unsurprisingly, the most commonly expressed motivation was 
a generalized concern about the environment or the health of the 
planet.172 These ranged from expressions of wanting to “preserve the 
environment”173 to more urgent statements, such as “I believe that we 
are killing the/our planet!”174 Some indicated that they were motivated 
by a sense of obligation to the future, whether to future generations 
specifically, or to the future of the planet in general.175 A smaller 
number stated that they were motivated by a concern that we might run 
out of resources.176  
Another motivation, similar to one expressed by some of the CRAG 
members who had taken individual action before joining or starting a 
CRAG, was to assist others and set an example.177 Related to this, some 
were motivated by a desire for community and fellowship, both to learn 
from others, and to make the efforts more fun and meaningful.178 In a 
                                                                                                                     
 172. See Summary of NCAG Respondents (on file with author). 
 173. Response of Digger Braymiller (Aug. 8, 2009) (on file with author). 
 174. Response of Cynthia Frigard (July 12, 2009) (on file with author). 
 175. See Response of Digger Braymiller, supra note 173; Response of Sue Cable (Aug. 8, 
2009) (on file with author); Response of Henry Mueller, supra note 4; Response of Scott 
Ruprecht (Aug. 8, 2009) (on file with author). 
 176. E.g., Response of Sue Cable, supra note 175; Response of Donald Price (Aug. 8, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 177. See Response of Dan Friedlander (June 15, 2009) (on file with author); Response of 
Tom Mckinnon (June 11, 2009) (on file with author). 
 178. See Response of Linda Cornett (July 4, 2009) (on file with author); Response of John 
Hatch (July 23, 2009) (on file with author); Response of Tom Mckinnon, supra note 177. 
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similar vein, some acknowledged that a healthy sense of peer pressure 
and evolving community norms had motivated them.179 Also similar to 
the CRAG responses, NCAG members articulated personal ethical 
motivations, including avoiding hypocrisy (feeling as though one cannot 
lobby neighbors to do something without doing it oneself),180 and more 
general expressions of moral obligation to take care of things. As one 
respondent put it, he evolved from seeing the issue in the abstract to 
seeing it as personal. Change was happening much more quickly, and he 
was starting to feel personally responsible.181 Finally, and also similar to 
some CRAG members, some NCAG participants indicated that specific 
factual information about the severity of the consequences of failing to 
act, and the small window of time in which to act to avoid those 
consequences, had made a difference to them.182 As one participant 
described, “I first became aware of the climate problem in 1981 or 
1982 . . . but it became front-burner for the last four or five years due to 
increasing knowledge of certainty and urgency of the problem.”183 
ii.  Individual Behavior Changes and Their Efficacy 
The range of behavior changes that NCAG participants made was 
somewhat narrower than the CRAG members. For example, no NCAG 
participant reported living with other people solely to reduce a carbon 
footprint, and only one NCAG participant indicated giving up air travel 
entirely. The CRAG structure, consisting of a carbon rationing scheme 
and accounting program, reflects and reinforces a more intense 
orientation toward personal emissions reductions. The NCAG 
structures, on the other hand, are less formal and more focused on social 
and educational methods for encouraging carbon-neutral behavior than 
on setting personal or group emissions reductions goals and monitoring 
schemes. Nonetheless, the range of actions taken to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions (and to live with less environmental impact generally) 
was impressively broad. 
With respect to transportation, many NCAG members reported that 
they had reduced their driving by walking or cycling as often as they 
could.184 Several also reduced their driving by moving closer to their 
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workplace or commuting to work on public transportation.185 One 
respondent had reduced his annual vehicle mileage to less than 2,000 
miles per year.186 Several commented that their families relied on only 
one car, while others commented that they had purchased high-mileage 
or more efficient vehicles.187 Only one person reported that she had 
given up flying.188 Another reported that he had cut his air travel by 
50%, though he did not indicate his previous baseline.189 For another, 
however, reducing air travel had proven very difficult; he described it as 
the “Achilles heel” of his carbon footprint.190  
In the category of home-efficiency improvements, almost everyone 
reported that they had switched from incandescent to compact 
fluorescent lightbulbs. People also reported a range of changes to their 
appliances, including using a manual as opposed to gasoline-powered 
lawn mower; purchasing new hot water heaters or furnaces; installing 
ceiling fans for both cooling and heating; adding programmable 
thermostats; installing evaporative cooling systems instead of air 
conditioners; and installing dual-flush and low-flow toilets.191 In 
addition, like Don Allen, who participated in the Shanahan Neighbors 
Home Energy Efficiency Tour, many NCAG members reported 
improving their home insulation, or otherwise making construction 
improvements to increase the natural heating and cooling properties of 
their homes.192 
Many also reported that they reduced their energy consumption by 
hanging laundry to dry,193 and some expressed particular satisfaction 
about this behavior. “It just feels real good,” one person commented 
after describing her year-round system for outdoor clothes drying on her 
sunny Colorado deck.194 Another, who had made extensive changes to 
reduce his carbon footprint, including building a house that “is an 
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uDoing/videos.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2009); hard copy on file with author. 
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attempt at zero energy,” equipped with solar PV and hot water panels, 
added, “I like and enjoy the simple things more, like the laundry line. I 
actually really enjoy hanging out my laundry because I know I am using 
less electricity . . . .”195  
Another category of action was changing the source of home energy 
use. Many NCAG respondents had mounted either solar PV panels or 
solar hot water heaters on their homes.196 Others had built or modified 
their homes to maximize passive solar energy, and some had purchased 
wind energy credits from their utility providers.197 Finally, NCAG 
participants reported a variety of activities that contribute more 
indirectly to emissions reductions and that also fit generally with 
environmental sustainability. These included growing more of their own 
food in backyard or community gardens; generally buying food from 
local producers; eating low on the food chain; using reused and recycled 
consumer products whenever possible; composting; avoiding excessive 
packaging; bringing their own bags for grocery and other shopping; and 
exercising similar no-waste behavior.198  
iii.  Importance of the Group in Spurring Personal Reductions  
NCAG members had a variety of views about the role and 
importance of the neighborhood group. Some indicated that the group 
played an important role in motivating or encouraging their own 
personal behavior changes.199 Others, similar to some of the CRAG 
members, said that they would have made the individual changes 
anyway, but either initiated or joined a group to educate and encourage 
others.200 Some indicated that their groups had not proven to be as 
active as they had hoped.201 Many respondents said that the social and 
community-building aspects of the group were important to them.202 As 
one put it, she joined her neighborhood group to “do a good deed” and 
to “get to know neighbors.”203 Another said that she wanted to be more 
connected to her community and that there was “strength in 
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numbers.”204 One person described his group as a “mellow” one that 
served social and communication purposes (such as sharing information 
about wildlife sightings in the neighborhood205), in addition to 
encouraging emissions reductions.  
For some, their group’s establishment of connections, mutual 
support, and habits of sustainability were more important than any 
quantitative effects on emissions reduction. One neighborhood leader 
said that in the grand scheme of things, his group (which was one of the 
most active surveyed), has only 
a miniscule effect on carbon emissions. Overall GHG 
emissions [are] a population/economic/technology/social/ 
cultural and political issue. Our main accomplishment is to 
give people hope, unite them as neighbors and prepare 
them to play a positive role in the future as the global 
warming crisis moves south from the arctic to envelop our 
reality.206 
iv.  Assessment of Emissions Reductions: Quantity and Quality 
The informal nature of NCAGs, as compared to CRAGs, makes it 
more difficult to assess the quantitative efficacy of these individual 
efforts. Very few respondents reported that they had kept records of 
how their efforts had reduced their carbon footprint. The reports of the 
changes themselves, however, indicate that participants have adopted 
many of the transportation, efficiency, and energy source behaviors that 
experts tout as key to part of a larger shift to a carbon-free economy.207  
v.  Views About Geoengineering Solutions 
Many NCAG participants had no views about geoengineering 
solutions because they did not know enough about them to comment.208 
Several, however, were quite knowledgeable and tended to express 
concern or skepticism. One strand of concern was that the costs would 
be difficult to assess due to the unknown, and perhaps unknowable, 
effects of several geoengineering strategies.209 Another strand was the 
moral hazard concern, which states that we tend to favor technological 
alternatives that appear easy and costless (to our way of life), rather than 
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taking actions that we know will work today, such as decarbonizing our 
energy supplies and decreasing energy demand through behavior 
change and efficiency.210 Despite these strongly articulated worries, 
some of the same respondents acknowledged that research into some 
geoengineering solutions was warranted.211 
vi.  Degree of Optimism: How Optimism or Pessimism Informs 
Assessment of the Worth of Individual and Small Group Action 
Like the CRAG respondents, NCAG members were thoughtful in 
their articulations of optimism or pessimism. Overall, they were split in 
their outlook. Equal numbers reported clear optimism and pessimism, 
but several reported mixed expressions about their views.212 Those who 
expressed pessimism, or a mixed outlook, had poignant explanations for 
why they nonetheless are taking action. One said that she was not 
optimistic that  
we will be able to maintain the world as it exists now. 
However, I hope we will give ourselves wholly to the effort 
to do so, so we will be better prepared to deal with the 
world that will come to be. I’m doing what I can because 
doing nothing is unthinkable. If I was shipwrecked alone in 
the middle of the ocean, I wouldn’t lie back and wait to 
sink. I’d swim toward an unseen shore because it’s all I 
could do.213 
Another said that he is not always optimistic, but he still thinks that we 
have to take action and attempt to find solutions because “[e]ven if our 
civilization fails, at least we’ve tried to create a blueprint for future 
cultures. We owe this to the generations that follow us and all the 
human beings that have sacrificed to give us what we have today.”214 
Another said that while he was generally an optimist, he worried that we 
“[h]aven’t started early enough to make a smooth transition. Some will 
continue to suffer (like the poor will be hit particularly hard over this). 
Things on the other side will look very different. Could be much better, 
but will be more local and less consumptive . . . .”215 One said that he is 
not optimistic in general, but that he “has an optimistic side” because if 
he didn’t, he “would be suicidal.” He “[l]oves the outdoors” so feels he 
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has to act, and he does so for “hope,” even though when he started out, 
he thought he was going to be able to solve the problem.216 
B.  Insights from Local Climate Action: Behavior, Happiness, Ethics, 
and Values 
This in-depth, qualitative look at local climate initiatives yields 
several conclusions. First, on a quantitative level, CRAG and NCAG 
members are doing much to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. 
Vandenbergh and his colleagues have described certain behavioral 
changes as “low-hanging fruit” because they can be achieved at a low 
cost, yet they have a relatively high impact on emissions reduction.217 
These behaviors include reducing motor vehicle idling, accelerating 
compact fluorescent lightbulb adoption, adjusting thermostats by two 
degrees, and other minor efficiency adjustments.218  
Many CRAG and NCAG participants have reached much higher up 
the tree. To reduce their carbon emissions, some have given up driving 
or stopped flying.219 Others have abandoned electric appliances, which 
have been touted as the birthright of successful Americans for decades. 
Some have done all of these things, taking every conceivable measure 
to reduce their energy consumption, even including altering their living 
circumstances.220 Vandenbergh calculated that household emissions 
account for as much as 31% of total U.S. emissions, and therefore 
advocates for policies and programs that influence behaviors in cost-
effective ways.221 Policymakers targeting household emissions can 
point to the CRAG and NCAG participants as early adopters of 
behaviors that, through incentives, decision influence, and like 
measures, the state can assist others in embracing.222 To be sure, CRAG 
and NCAG members represent a highly motivated leading edge, rather 
than the average citizen. But their actions and attitudes can be 
highlighted as exemplary, both to inspire others and to encourage 
practices that might form the first step toward other, more significant 
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attitude and behavior changes.223 
Beyond the quantitative effects, many CRAG and NCAG 
participants express a sense of joy and satisfaction with their actions. 
They claim that “no hair shirts” have been donned;224 that hanging their 
laundry makes them happy; that they enjoy walking and biking 
everywhere; that their actions “just feel good . . . .”225 More importantly, 
they feel these things despite the fact that many of them harbor no 
illusions that their actions alone can or will be enough. They know that 
their individual efforts must, some day very soon, be complemented by 
state led initiatives to corral the rest of the world to decarbonize. As 
Andy Ross, founder of the UK CRAGs, mused:  
Maybe it goes like this. At first, people are attracted to 
the CRAGgy idea that Climate Justice should begin at 
home through a careful look at their personal contribution 
to the ecological crisis and through taking responsibility for 
it through involvement in a CRAG. Later, they begin to feel 
that for their efforts to make sense, this notion of Climate 
Justice has to migrate to the corridors of Westminster and 
Washington in order to be made into law.226 
According to Ross, local climate action participants are motivated 
by a sense of personal and group obligation, but they hope that their 
efforts inspire the government to act.227 They understand that they need 
the state to transform their efforts into policies that stand a chance of 
reducing emissions globally.228 This complicated picture of satisfaction, 
inspiration, and political engagement fills in what has been missing 
from discussions of the role that “happiness” assessments might play in 
formulating environmental policy.229 For the most part, happiness (or 
satisfaction) has been proposed as an alternative measure to assess well-
being.230 Subjective happiness evaluations, the argument proceeds, are 
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an improvement over quantified measures such as income because they 
allow for a more realistic assessment of the difference that material 
wealth makes to well-being, relative to other factors.231 CRAG and 
NCAG participants seem, on one hand, to fit into some of the 
literature’s conclusions regarding the diminishing happiness effects of 
extra consumption beyond certain levels of wealth.232 They are creating 
a new social norm of responsible low-carbon living, and generating 
happiness from their association with that status.233 Yet it seems 
unlikely, for many of them, that they will remain satisfied with their 
personal actions if they are not also contributing to an effective global 
solution. Perhaps more accurately, many will vacillate, as humans do, 
between satisfied, wistful, frustrated, joyous, depressed, and outraged.  
This is where ethics come into play. NCAG and CRAG participants 
are doing more than what feels good—they are trying to do what seems 
right.234 This is a complicated formula for well-being, one that does not 
translate easily into empirical data, let alone policy prescriptions 
formulated from such data.235 Participants in local climate action groups 
are attempting to forge an ethic and identity that includes obligations to 
the planet, to other species, and to future generations.236 While 
philosophers and legal academics theorize about such obligations, these 
people are actually doing it.237 As one CRAG member said, “Ask not 
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what the planet may do for you . . . ask rather what you can do to save 
the planet . . . and do it.”238 Aldo Leopold, proponent of the “land 
ethic,” would be proud, particularly given that he turned to ethics 
because, like our planetarians, he did not think government alone would 
or could do the job.239 Yet, to circle back to the state’s role, part of the 
CRAG/NCAG aspiration is to influence government to do its part, as 
well.240 CRAG and NCAG participants are forging the planetarian 
identity, in part, because they want it to spread. They recognize that it 
will take government regulation for that to happen. The next Part 
therefore explores the possibility for a state role in that regard.  
III.  TENDING THE PLANETARIAN IDENTITY  
A.  The Role of the State, Part Two 
Two strands of insight emerge from the narratives of local climate 
action. First, although the literature about how to get the state to 
“activate norms,” “harness behavior,” and otherwise prod, nudge, and 
incentivize us is important, it is missing something.241 Despite the 
efforts of these commentators to bring ethics, norms, and individual 
actions to bear on environmental law, there remains something 
familiarly and numbingly bureaucratic about the framework and the 
vocabulary. People remain the object of state action, the passive 
subjects of state behavior modification. The stories about local climate 
action groups remind us that, in the beginning, these efforts are about 
people trying to live meaningful lives by working out their ideas and 
ideals in communities.242 That set of ideals and goals is at the heart of 
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localism, even localism that has the global and highly abstract goal of 
stopping climate change at its core. 
Second, as the pessimists in local climate action groups know, there 
truly is a tragic structure to their situation. They are taking action 
because they feel moral and social responsibility to do so.243 Yet as 
Andrew Ross’ comments above indicate,244 they want the world to 
follow suit, which will require top-down coordination, legislation, 
regulation, incentivization, and so forth, dragging these and other local 
efforts back into bureaucratic systems, with an uncertain chance of 
success. The dual tragedy that haunts these efforts is that, on the one 
hand, success may mean that bureaucratic systems, and not the vibrant 
lifeworlds of local communities, will take over; and, on the other, even 
when bureaucratic systems assume their place, they might not stave off 
many of the effects of climate change. What if, despite designing the 
optimal climate regime (which, to date, we have failed to do), we 
nonetheless cannot keep our emissions in check?245 Then, if we have 
relinquished to the state the job of adjusting our behavior for us, we will 
be in even greater difficulty because we will lack the skills, norms, and 
communities to chart a path through a protean and unknowable world.  
This particular risk for the state has never been fully considered in 
the context of environmental law, perhaps because the debate has been 
framed largely as a contest between the pro-regulatory crowd and the 
pro-market crowd.246 On the pro-regulatory side, the emphasis is on 
solving the particular environmental problem. On the pro-market side, 
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the emphasis is on maximizing welfare as defined by reference to 
human preference, which is reducible to monetary value. The question 
is therefore posed, often both in the policy context and the academic 
literature, in the following way: Should our laws aim to achieve a 
certain environmental goal at the expense of economic and other 
considerations, or should our laws take account of the total cost–benefit 
picture when implementing environmentally protective policies? 
Underlying both questions is the assumption that humans will inevitably 
make progress toward either goal, and that the losses are only those 
accounted for when selecting the particular goal. Yet what if the 
progress assumption is wrong? Then, in both accounts, we are 
misdescribing the appropriate roles and risks for the state. 
Understanding this may help to illuminate a recurring love-hate, or 
hope-cynicism, cycle that recurs with respect to public attitudes toward 
government in the realm of natural resources and the environment.247
That cycle is, in part, a product of the inevitable alienation from local 
community concerns that results from enlisting the state to address 
environmental problems. The vibrancy of the local gets sacrificed to the 
bureaucrats’ (or the market’s) expertise, a sacrifice perhaps worth 
enduring if the air and water get cleaner (or, pursuant to the market-
based alternative, everyone gets wealthier and we achieve an efficient 
amount of environmental health). What if neither goal is attainable? 
Perhaps, then, the local environmental instinct, which at its core is to 
take care of where we live, will have been snubbed for nothing.  
B.  A Blueprint for a Climate-Changed Democracy248 
To construct solutions that link global scale regulation with local 
actions, and to recruit the best science and technology without 
obliterating the communities whom those technologies purport to serve, 
it helps to look backward, as well as ahead. In 1878, John Wesley 
Powell proposed to stop westward expansion long enough to allow for a 
detailed survey of the lands in what he called the Arid Region.249 After 
                                                                                                                     
 247. See ECOAMERICA & SRI CONSULTING, THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
SURVEY: AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN AN ERA OF POLARIZATION AND 
CONFLICTING PRIORITIES 3 (2006), available at http://ecoamerica.typepad.com/blog/files/eco 
America_AEVS_Report.pdf (“Americans’ active support for environmental protection has been 
steadily eroding. . . . And while 77% of Americans say they worry about the environment a 
great deal or [a] fair amount, for most of them it is neither a personal nor a public policy 
priority.”). 
 248. See WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN 202−42 (Penguin Books 
1992) (1953) (describing, in a chapter entitled “Blueprint for a Dryland Democracy,” John 
Wesley Powell’s proposals for land and resource settlement in the arid west during the 1870s).  
 249. See JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE 
UNITED STATES WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH, at vii−ix (2d ed. 
1879). 
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the survey, settlement could resume in an orderly manner, based upon 
what the land and resources could sustain.250 Powell was not anti-
settlement. Nor was he even a conservationist, let alone an anti-growth 
radical environmentalist. Rather, he wanted to ensure that resource 
exploitation would occur in a manner that would be sustainable in the 
long run and would allow human communities to flourish in an 
environment marked by scarcity.251 Powell knew well the limits of the 
Arid Region. He, along with various crews of intrepid and rag-tag 
amateur surveyors, had already begun the project of cataloguing every 
acre between the one-hundredth meridian and the Sierra mountains.252 
His recommendations to Congress, submitted in what has become 
known as the Arid Lands Report, were based on his personal, intimate, 
and very scientific knowledge of the land and its limits.253  
Two aspects of Powell’s proposals are salient to the subject matter 
of this Article. First, Powell aimed to promote democratic communities 
capable of local natural resource governance. The recommendations that 
supported this ideal included first, that homestead boundaries should be 
determined by topography and availability of water, rather than by 
rectangular grids,254 and second, that cooperative districts composed of 
bona fide settlers should govern irrigation and pasturage lands.255 With 
sound scientific information (afforded by the surveys) and local 
institutions, Powell believed the arid west could be settled humanely, 
sustainably, and democratically.256  
The second relevant aspect of Powell’s approach was that the state, 
in the form of the federal government, had to impose the necessary 
restraint on the populace to ensure that democratic agrarian 
communities would form. Without a temporary halt to settlement, 
accompanied by clear rules about how settlement would take place and 
the conditions that would pertain for ownership of land and water, 
Powell believed that the ordinary person would suffer and that agrarian 
democracy would fail.257 Powell was willing to employ his expertise in 
                                                                                                                     
 250. See id. 
 251. See id.; see also STEGNER, supra note 248, at 220–29 (describing Powell’s 
motivations, which included settling the land in a manner consistent with the land’s capacities to 
support small farming communities).  
 252. See STEGNER, supra note 248, at 116–201.  
 253. See generally POWELL, supra note 249. 
 254. See id. at 27–37. 
 255. See id.  
 256. See STEGNER, supra note 248, at 220–29. 
 257. See id. at 220−26; see also DONALD WORSTER, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: THE LIFE OF 
JOHN WESLEY POWELL 354–60 (2001) (describing Powell’s motivations and efforts to get his 
Arid Lands proposals passed). “The large economic interests did not line up in support, 
understandably, since Powell’s motive was to save the West for the people, not the 
corporations.” Id. at 358. 
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top-down fashion to ensure that individuals and communities could 
thrive in the Arid Region. 
As discussed in Part I, scholars and activists have identified the 
analogous need for expertise and imposition of restraint (including 
market-based solutions as a form of restraint) at the highest levels of 
government in the context of climate change.258 Approaching the 
problem at the lower ends of the scale, some individual states, counties, 
and American Indian tribes are engaging in climate adaptation planning 
in order to achieve a mix of expertise, regulation, and support for 
communities.259 Yet they are doing so without the aid of top-down 
legislation or enforcement of limitations on carbon. Powell’s plans, by 
contrast, included both the high and low levels of organization.260 What 
if federal climate legislation, along with some mechanism for putting a 
price on greenhouse gas emissions, included local climate-action 
districts charged with the authority and means to develop the most 
sustainable, flexible, and locally appropriate practices for living in a 
zero-carbon (and ecologically uncertain) world?261 Note that this is 
different from, though not necessarily exclusive of, suggesting that 
federal legislation should include mechanisms to modify or shape our 
norms and behavior.262 Rather, the idea, like Powell’s, is to legislate in a 
manner that allows people to realize their values and norms on the 
ground and in communities, the way people actually live.263 There are 
likely several possible designs for achieving this idea through federal 
law and policy.264 This Article’s modest objective in this regard is 
                                                                                                                     
 258. See discussion supra Section I.B. Professor Richard Lazarus has gone one step 
further, aptly describing the need for the federal government to restrain itself from unraveling its 
own climate regime, if it passes one. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 1184−204 (describing 
obstacles to passing climate legislation as well as post-passage likelihood of receding from 
legislative commitments). 
 259. See, e.g., GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 2009 CALIFORNIA CLIMATE 
ADAPTATION STRATEGY (2009); Ron Sims, King County Proposes Global Warming Action Plan 
(Feb. 7, 2007), http://your.kingcounty.gov/exec/news/2007/0207warming.aspx; Swinomish 
Climate Change Initiative, http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/climate_change/project/project.html 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2011). 
 260. See POWELL, supra note 249, at 27–37.  
 261. This idea is consistent with Professor Ostrom’s proposal for a polycentric approach. 
See Ostrom, supra note 3, at 14–15.  
 262. See Green, supra note 7 (analyzing the effect of legislation on the development of 
social norms); Vandenbergh et al., supra note 7 (arguing that a combination of legislation, 
information, and economic incentives may be an effective means to reduce household 
emissions).  
 263. The bioregionalism movement is similar in spirit and outline to this suggestion. See 
ROBERT L. THAYER, JR., LIFEPLACE: BIOREGIONAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 1–9 (2003) 
(describing tenets of bioregionalism). The key difference is that citizens engaged in local 
climate action are intimately involved in their own regions and communities while at the same 
time working in service to a planetarian (global, as well as future-generational) goal.  
 264. See, e.g., Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and Climate Change: New 
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merely to begin the conversation about the value of such a structure.  
The vision of regional democratic communities, governing 
consistently with what the land and water would sustain over the long 
run, sounds utopian, and indeed it was, at least in Powell’s day. Those 
aspects of Powell’s proposals never became law, and as quickly as 
settlement was paused, it resumed again.265 The surveys were not 
completed in time, and settlers rushed the land, seizing their rectangular 
homestead plots, and facing, for many, repeated cycles of failure.266 
Many western natural resource experts have mused over whether much 
heartache, corruption, and ecological waste could have been avoided if 
Powell’s plans had been realized.267 What will the experts of the next 
century muse about with respect to what we found too odd, too utopian, 
and too unrealistic today? 
CONCLUSION 
Climate change is the ultimate reflection of human control, 
domination, and influence. We have altered the earth’s atmosphere, 
with effects ranging from the chemical composition of the world’s 
oceans to the life cycle of a small beetle.268 If humans are responsible 
for the contours of life on both the largest and smallest scales, then 
whether to walk or drive, whether to hang the laundry, whether to leave 
the lights on—suddenly all of these mundane decisions have the 
potential to be shot through with morality. This is the ethical framework 
being created in local climate action groups, where neighbors meet to 
swap tips about insulating window treatments, hoping that their daily 
habits will translate into communities capable of saving the world, or 
failing that, of communities fit for the lost world to come. 
Localism, in the context of climate change, acknowledges the sweep 
of human control and influence, and attempts to construct a morality to 
match it. For the majority of people, however, the law of global 
                                                                                                                     
Meaning to “Think Globally—Act Locally,” 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,562, 10,570 (2010) (listing 
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 265. See STEGNER, supra note 248, at 337. 
 266. See id. at 328–45.  
 267. See, e.g., Charles Wilkinson, Western Water: The Ethical and Spiritual Questions, 1 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 367, 371–73 (2002); Charles F. Wilkinson, In Memoriam, Prior 
Appropriation 1848−1991, 21 ENVTL. L. v, x–xii (1991).  
 268. See Ken Caldeira & Micahel E. Wickett, Anthropogenic Carbon and Ocean pH, 425 
NATURE 365, 365 (2003) (“We find that oceanic absorption of CO2 from fossil fuels may result 
in larger pH changes over the next several centuries than any inferred from the geological record 
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Beetle and Climate Change, 2008 USDA RES. F. ON INVASIVE SPECIES 63 (2008) (describing 
climate effects on the lifecycle of the pine beetle), available at 
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warming remains an enervating topic.269 This can be attributed, at least 
in part, to the ways in which the collective action features of global 
warming leave to the state the familiar, and familiarly dull and 
begrudged, role of expert super-bureaucrat. If we overemphasize the 
state’s role at the expense of the role of the local law of climate change, 
we come away bored, despairing, apathetic, or all three.270 Bored 
because the problem is so abstract and technical that only scientists, 
engineers, economists, and other wonky types can understand it—let 
alone do anything about it. Despairing because the problem seems 
unsolvable without massive changes in politics. And apathetic because, 
combining the abstract and technical nature of the problem with its 
seeming insolubility, why care?271 
Yet, as participants in local climate action groups recognize, they 
need the state to assume the roles that only it can play—regulator, taxer, 
nudger-in-chief—to ensure that their local efforts are not futile. Lurking 
behind this paradox is a still-deeper one. Even if the state assumes these 
roles very soon, it remains possible (or probable) that the world will 
never succeed at stabilizing the climate at a level that avoids serious 
consequences for our and other species. But if the worlds being created 
in local climate action groups take hold, they will at least have arrived, 
ethically, at the possibility of tending the planet (and whichever 
communities it will sustain), even as global surface temperatures 
continue to rise. Developing norms, laws, and perhaps most importantly, 
senses of humor to facilitate the planetarian identity may be the best we 
can do, and not in the defeatist sense—it may actually be the best thing 
that humans can do. If the law of local climate action contributes to this 
small revolution, then it may complement the quantitative and 
technological accomplishments of national environmental regulation in 
ways that lead us to a cleaner, greener, more sustainable world. And if 
these accomplishments are not forthcoming in the realm of climate 
change, then at least some human communities will have formed the 
habits of flexibility, mutual support, and low-impact living necessary to 
face the alternative. Either localism will redeem statist versions of 
environmental law by helping each to realize the planetarian goals of the 
other, or localism alone will nurture a planetarian identity, the object of 
which will be a moving target in every conceivable sense. 
                                                                                                                     
 269. See, e.g., ECOAMERICA & SRI CONSULTING, supra note 247 (surveying Americans on 
a range of environmental issues and finding waning support for environmentalism generally, as 
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